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THE DISAPPOINTING HISTORY OF SCIENCE 
IN THE COURTROOM: FRYE, DAUBERT, AND 
THE ONGOING CRISIS OF “JUNK SCIENCE” 
IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 
JIM HILBERT* 
Introduction 
Twenty-five years ago, the Supreme Court decided one of the most 
important cases concerning the use of science in courtrooms.
1
  In Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
2
 the Court addressed widespread 
concerns that courts were admitting unreliable scientific evidence.
3
  In 
addition, lower courts lacked clarity on the status of the previous landmark 
                                                                                                                 
 * Jim Hilbert is an Associate Professor of Law at Mitchell Hamline School of Law 
and Co-Director of the Expert Witness Training Academy, which trains climate scientists 
through a grant from the National Science Foundation.  He would like to thank Professor 
Peter Knapp, Professor Kate Kruse, and Professor Ted Sampsell-Jones for their helpful 
guidance, comments, and encouragement. 
 1. See David E. Bernstein, The Unfinished Daubert Revolution, ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST 
SOC'Y PRAC. GROUPS, Feb. 2009, at 35, 35 (declaring Daubert as “probably the most radical, 
sudden, and consequential change in the modern history of the law of evidence”); Barbara P. 
Billauer, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Under Daubert: The Fatal Flaws of 
‘Falsifiability’ and ‘Falsification,’ 22 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 21, 23 (2016) [hereinafter 
Billauer, Admissibility] (claiming the Daubert decision “would profoundly change the face 
of scientific evidence in American courts”); David L. Faigman, The Daubert Revolution and 
the Birth of Modernity: Managing Scientific Evidence in the Age of Science, 46 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 893, 895 (2013) (describing the changes ushered in by Daubert as “revolutionary”); 
Erin Murphy, Neuroscience and the Civil/Criminal Daubert Divide, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 
619, 621 (2016) (“When announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1993, Daubert was 
heralded as a watershed moment in the treatment of scientific evidence.”).  
 2. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  
 3. According to a popular, yet polemical, book at the time, the courts were overrun 
with pseudo-science and fake expertise in the late 1980s.  See PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S 
REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 2 (1991) (“Maverick scientists shunned by their 
reputable colleagues have been embraced by lawyers.  Eccentric theories that no respectable 
government agency would ever fund are rewarded munificently by the courts. . . .  Courts 
resound with elaborate, systematized, jargon-filled, serious-sounding deceptions that fully 
deserve the contemptuous label used by trial lawyers themselves: junk science.”).  For a 
more thorough discussion, and critique, of Huber’s book, see infra notes 108-114 and 
accompanying text. 
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case for courtroom science, Frye v. United States.
4
  In the years leading up 
to the Daubert decision, policy-makers and legal observers sounded the 
alarm about the rise in the use of “junk science” by so-called expert 
witnesses.
5
  Some critics went so far as to suggest that American businesses 
and the viability of the court system itself were at stake.
6
 
Despite the likely exaggeration of such claims, the law of the 
admissibility of expert testimony certainly needed reform by the time of 
Daubert.
7
  As the Court itself acknowledged, there was a circuit split on the 
appropriate standard for courts to apply.
8
  Lower courts had been applying 
inconsistent criteria and, for the most part, had ignored the nearly twenty-
year-old codified rule of evidence on the subject.
9
  In addition, after a 
century of the growth of science in the courtroom,
10
 expert witnesses had 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), overruled by Daubert, 
509 U.S. 579.  In Daubert, the Court held that Frye was superseded by Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702, which governs expert testimony in federal courts.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588. 
 5. In the early 1990s, “[t]he President's Council on Competitiveness, chaired by former 
Vice President Dan Quayle, established a Civil Justice Reform Task Force” to examine the 
perceived proliferation of unreliable expert testimony.  Paul C. Giannelli, ‘Junk Science’: 
The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105, 109 (1993).  Vice President 
Quayle became an outspoken advocate for reforming the tort system, claiming that 
“uncontrolled use of expert witnesses . . . has also allowed ‘junk science’ to tarnish the legal 
process.”  Dan Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559, 565 (1992). 
 6. One leading book spared no hyperbole.  See WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION 
EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT 2 (1991) (“The 
unleashing of litigation in its full fury has done cruel, grave harm and little lasting good.  It 
has helped sunder some of the most sensitive and profound relationships of human 
life . . . .”).   
 7. Indeed, the standards of how expert witness testimony would be assessed had been 
inconsistent for the previous 100 years or more.  The variety of ways courts assessed the 
admissibility of expert witnesses “became the crucible in which Frye was reexamined, 
sometimes questioned, often implicitly modified, and occasionally rejected.”  Mark 
McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. 
REV. 879, 885 (1982). 
 8. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585 (“We granted certiorari in light of sharp divisions among 
the courts regarding the proper standard for the admission of expert testimony.”) (citation 
omitted). 
 9. See, e.g., Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Torts, Causation, and Scientific Evidence 
After Daubert, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 889, 910 (1994) (evaluating cases and writing at the time 
of the Daubert decision that “courts have been uncertain regarding the precise scope of the 
Federal Rules”). 
 10. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 73 
BROOK. L. REV. 1009, 1009 (2008) (“In various ways, skilled witnesses have been used in 
courtroom processes since just about the dawn of the jury trial.  The expert witness in its 
modern form—a witness whose presence in court results not from being a percipient witness 
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become a prominent feature of the legal system, requiring courts to respond 
to more and more questions concerning the admissibility of their 
testimony.
11
  
More specifically, however, Daubert was arguably supposed to address 
the sort of junk science that had surfaced in the criminal case, Barefoot v. 
Estelle, ten years earlier.
12
  In Barefoot, the Court allowed the testimony of 
a psychiatrist regarding the future dangerousness of the defendant in order 
to impose the death penalty.
13
  The Court did so despite clear evidence “that 
psychiatrists simply have no expertise in predicting long-term future 
dangerousness” and that “two out of three predictions of long-term future 
                                                                                                                 
to material facts, but instead because of education, training, experience, or other specialized 
knowledge relevant to the case, and who is called by one party to testify, and is typically 
compensated by that party as well—can be traced back to at least the middle of the 
nineteenth century.”).  According to Judge Posner, there is “a widespread, and increasingly 
troublesome, discomfort among lawyers and judges confronted by a scientific or other 
technological issue.”  Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 787 (7th Cir. 2013) (Posner, J.).  As 
he explained, “[I]t's increasingly concerning, because of the extraordinary rate of scientific 
and other technological advances that figure increasingly in litigation.”  Id. at 788. 
 11. According to numerous studies, expert witnesses now appear in the vast majority of 
trials.  Remarkably, three major studies have each concluded that expert witnesses appear in 
86% of cases.  See Andrew W. Jurs, Expert Prevalence, Persuasion, and Price: What Trial 
Participants Really Think About Experts, 91 IND. L.J. 353, 355 (2016) (finding that “the data 
reveals that expert witnesses appear in 86% of the cases in the study, which is an identical 
percentage as in two prior research studies”); Shari Seidman Diamond, How Jurors Deal 
with Expert Testimony and How Judges Can Help, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 47, 56 (2007) (finding 
that forty-three of the fifty civil trials examined in Arizona involved expert testimony 
(86%)); Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1119 (finding that 86% 
of 529 reported cases from 1985 and 1986 from Jury Verdicts Weekly involved expert 
testimony); see also Anthony Champagne, Daniel Shuman & Elizabeth Whitaker, An 
Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in American Courts, 31 JURIMETRICS 
J. 375 (1991) (finding that expert witnesses featured in 63% of cases in the study); Daniel 
W. Shuman, Elizabeth Whitaker & Anthony Champagne, An Empirical Examination of the 
Use of Expert Witnesses in the Courts-Part II: A Three City Study, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 193 
(1994) (72%). 
 12. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 916 (1983).  As the co-founder of the Innocence 
Project put it, “Many thought Daubert would be the meaningful standard that was lacking in 
criminal cases and that it would serve to protect innocent defendants.”  Peter J. Neufeld, The 
(Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. 
J. PUB. HEALTH S107, S109 (2009). 
 13. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 924 (“Death is a permissible punishment in Texas only if the 
jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability the defendant will commit 
future acts of criminal violence.”). 
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violence made by psychiatrists are wrong.”14  Justice Blackmun, who would 
go on to write the Daubert decision, expressed serious concerns in his 
blistering dissent in Barefoot as to “how juries are to separate valid from 
invalid expert opinions when the ‘experts’ themselves are so obviously 
unable to do so.”15      
The Daubert decision did not, however, address Barefoot or discuss any 
forensic science, for that matter.
16
  Since Daubert, courts have not used the 
decision to reign in the junk science of criminal prosecutions.
17
  Instead, 
with each new study unveiled in the twenty-five years since Daubert, the 
legal community has had to repeatedly confront the reality that nearly every 
method of forensic science is either of questionable validity or entirely 
unreliable.
18
   
More than just a failure of science, the inability of Daubert to address the 
problem of junk science in criminal cases has undoubtedly resulted in 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Id. at 920-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  As Justice Blackmun explained:  “Despite 
its recognition that the testimony at issue was probably wrong and certainly prejudicial, the 
Court holds this testimony admissible because the Court is ‘unconvinced . . . that the 
adversary process cannot be trusted to sort out the reliable from the unreliable evidence and 
opinion about future dangerousness.’”  Id. at 929. 
 15. Id. at 929.  Justice Blackmun was also particularly bothered by such lax oversight 
from the Court given that it was literally a question of life or death for the defendant.  See id. 
at 916 (“[W]hen a person's life is at stake—no matter how heinous his offense—a 
requirement of greater reliability should prevail. In a capital case, the specious testimony of 
a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an impressionable jury by the inevitable untouchability 
of a medical specialist's words, equates with death itself.”).  Particularly troublesome was 
that the psychiatrist testified that there was a “one hundred percent and absolute” chance that 
the defendant would commit future acts of criminal violence despite having never examined 
the defendant.  Id. at 919 (quoting the transcript).  Justice Blackmun, who had seriously 
considered going to medical school and spent nine years as resident counsel for the Mayo 
Clinic, was likely not terribly impressed with the methodology of the testifying psychiatrist.  
See generally Stephen L. Wasby, Justice Harry A. Blackmun in the Burger Court, 11 
HAMLINE L. REV. 183, 185 (1988) (detailing Justice Blackmun’s interest in medicine).  
 16. See infra notes 136-65 and accompanying text (discussing the Daubert decision). 
 17. See infra notes 166-79 and accompanying text (reviewing the post-Daubert case 
law). 
 18. See Jane Campbell Moriarty, Will History Be Servitude?: The NAS Report on 
Forensic Science and the Role of the Judiciary, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 299, 300 (“By not 
requiring minimal standards for the reliability of individualization evidence, courts have 
allowed the forensic science system to operate without any checks and balances and to 
convict innocent people in numbers we can only estimate.”); see also infra notes 209-308 
and accompanying text (reviewing studies on the continuing use of faulty science in criminal 
courts). 
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wrongful convictions, including some death penalty cases, like Barefoot.
19
  
Of the hundreds of such individuals who have been exonerated since 
Daubert, approximately half were imprisoned due to the use of faulty 
science in their trial.
20
  Science in the courtroom has cut both ways for 
criminal defendants.  DNA evidence has freed hundreds, but roughly half of 
those were wrongfully convicted because of defective forensic science in 
the first place.
21
 
Part I of this Article will address the history of expert witness admission 
in the modern legal era and the important role of Frye.  Part II of this 
Article will explore what led to Daubert and the Court’s decision.  Part III 
of this Article will distill the meaning of Daubert and subsequent Supreme 
Court cases and examine the many studies that have attempted to measure 
Daubert’s impact on the court system.  Part IV will discuss Daubert’s 
limited impact on the criminal justice system, highlighting a few 
profoundly disturbing examples of unreliable forensic science that currently 
plague criminal courts.  Part V will discuss potential options for improving 
how courts admit expert witness testimony. 
I. History of Expert Witness Testimony in American Courts 
A. The World Before Frye 
The use of experts in the courtroom is not a recent development.  As 
early as the mid-1800s, parties relied on expert testimony to make or defend 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See Eric S. Lander, Fixing Rule 702: The PCAST Report and Steps to Ensure the 
Reliability of Forensic Feature-Comparison Methods in the Criminal Courts, 86 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1661, 1662 (2018) (explaining that many defendants who were later exonerated 
were inmates on death row or had spent decades in prison, and that some of the defective 
science that courts allowed to convict them was “egregiously faulty”).   
 20. See Cynthia E. Jones, Here Comes the Judge: A Model for Judicial Oversight and 
Regulations of the Brady Disclosure Duty, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 87, 118 (2017) (“Nearly 
50% of the first 300 DNA-based exonerations of the Innocence Project involved inaccurate 
forensic science testimony.” (citing Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic 
Science: The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163, 172-96 (2007))); see also 
INNOCENCE PROJECT, WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS INVOLVING UNVALIDATED OR IMPROPER 
FORENSIC SCIENCE THAT WERE LATER OVERTURNED THROUGH DNA TESTING 1 (2016), 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/DNA_Exonerations_ 
Forensic_Science.pdf (reporting that “more than 50% [of exoneration cases] involved 
unvalidated or improper forensic science” as a contributing factor in wrongfully convicting 
the defendant). 
 21. Of course, the actual number of people wrongfully convicted by faulty science 
“must be considerably larger since evidence that could prove innocence is only rarely 
available and preserved.”  Lander, supra note 19, at 1663. 
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their case.
22
  Science was becoming an indispensable feature in many legal 
disputes.
23
  While Frye v. United States is often considered the first modern 
case on the admissibility of expert witness testimony,
24
 judges had been 
evaluating expert testimony under at least two standards for the previous 
several decades.
25
   
One common test courts employed was whether the expert testimony 
would assist the jury in understanding the facts of the case.  Using a basic 
relevancy test that in many ways modeled the current rule,
26
 courts simply 
evaluated the helpfulness of the evidence to a lay jury and admitted the 
evidence if it was relevant.
27
  Courts placed few limits on expert testimony, 
so long as it was relevant to the facts of the case and the expert was 
qualified.
28
  The basic question was whether the subject matter of a 
particular issue was beyond the range of knowledge of the average juror, 
and if so, whether a qualified expert's opinion “would be helpful, if not 
essential, to the jury's determination of the facts at issue.”29  As one 
commentator stated in 1880: 
The practice of the courts is to admit the testimony of a class of 
witnesses who are not supposed to have personal knowledge of 
any facts or circumstances bearing upon a pending case, but on 
the assumption that they are able from their special training and 
experience to apply scientific tests and present to the court and 
                                                                                                                 
 22. See Mnookin, supra note 10, at 1009. 
 23. See TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE 52 (2004) (“By the end of the 
eighteenth century, it was clear to the legal profession that in a growing number of cases, the 
‘Best Evidence that the nature of the thing was capable of’ could be produced by science and 
science alone.”). 
 24. See id. at 263 (“Although formulated in the radical context of the lie detector, it 
embodied a general judicial state of mind, the fruit of two centuries of growing legal 
dependence on, and frustration with, science.”). 
 25. See id. at 250 (explaining that at the time of Frye, “scientific evidence was mainly 
evaluated according to the two traditional evidentiary criteria: the logical relevancy and 
helpfulness of the evidence and the qualifications of the witness”). 
 26. David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: 
Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying About the Future of Scientific 
Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1803 n.11 (1994) (“The ‘helpfulness’ element of 
admissibility is still present today in the Federal Rules of Evidence.” (citing FED. R. EVID. 
702 (expert can testify if it “will assist the trier of fact”))). 
 27. Id. at 1803 (explaining that the relevant inquiry was whether the testimony was from 
an area beyond the knowledge of the average juror). 
 28. James R. Dillon, Expertise on Trial, 19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 247, 258 
(2018). 
 29. Faigman et al., supra note 26, at 1803. 
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jury the import and value of such evidence as may appear, which 
laymen could not be expected to comprehend and properly 
estimate.
30
  
 Back then, another common test for courts was assessing “the 
commercial success (outside of litigation) of the proffered witness in his or 
her field.”31  Known as the “the commercial marketplace test,” courts 
presumed that an expert was qualified if that expert could “make a living 
selling his knowledge in the marketplace.”32  Courts admitted expert 
testimony based on whether the expert had demonstrated professional 
success in the expertise at issue.
33
  Courts generally did not articulate the 
commercial place test, but rather implied it in their reasoning.
34
  An 
expert’s qualification “was implied from the expert's success in an 
occupation or profession which embraced that knowledge.”35   
To the extent courts applied these standards, they were applied rather 
loosely.  If the court deemed the expert’s testimony relevant and the expert 
qualified, parties had wide latitude to introduce the expert testimony as they 
saw fit.
36
  This relaxed approach to expert testimony was part of a larger 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id. at 1803 (quoting John B. Chapin, Experts and Expert Testimony, 22 ALB. L.J. 
365, 365 (1880)). 
 31. Michael J. Saks, Judging Admissibility, 35 J. CORP. L. 135, 136 (2009). 
 32. Faigman et al., supra note 26, at 1804. 
 33. Id. at 1804 (noting that judges would evaluate the qualifications and expertise of the 
expert through “the expert’s success in an occupation or profession which embraced” the 
subject matter in question); see also Saks, supra note 31, at 136 (explaining that judges often 
inferred expertise from the expert’s commercial success).  This practice goes back at least as 
far as the Civil War.  Id. 
 34. See, e.g., New England Glass Co. v. Lovell, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 319, 321 (1851) 
(“[I]t is because a man's professional pursuits, his peculiar skill and knowledge in some 
department of science, not common to men in general, enable him to draw an inference, 
where men of common experience, after all the facts proved, would be left in doubt.”); 
Buffum v. Harris, 5 R.I. 243, 251 (1858) (“[K]nowledge of any kind, gained for and in the 
course of one's business as pertaining thereto, is precisely that which entitles one to be 
considered an expert, so as to render his opinion, founded on such knowledge, admissible in 
evidence.”); see also Faigman et al., supra note 26, at 1804 (“This is not a point that courts 
made explicitly, but it seems to be implicit in the courts' determinations of who was 
‘qualified.’”); Saks, supra note 31, at 136 (“The implicit measure of expertise seems to have 
been how the expert witness fared in the commercial market for the witness's learning.”). 
 35. Faigman et al., supra note 26, at 1804. 
 36. See Dillon, supra note 28, at 258 (“As long as the proposed expert's testimony was 
relevant and the expert was qualified, parties generally were free to introduce the testimony 
of experts as they saw fit.”). 
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judicial philosophy of the “sporting theory”37 where quality control was 
exercised not by judges in excluding testimony, but by the parties through 
cross-examination and the adversarial process.
38
  As Professor Jennifer 
Mnookin puts it, “so long as parties had an equal opportunity to bring 
forward opposing experts, under the same rules and with the same judge as 
umpire, then whatever the jury made of the competing experts' stories was 
acceptable.”39 
By the turn of the century, however, every corner of the legal community 
began voicing concerns about the open policy for admitting expert 
testimony.
40
  Even a Supreme Court justice had earlier called expert 
opinions “reveries,” arguing that they were as “effective in producing 
obscurity and error, as in the elucidation of truth.”41  State supreme courts 
also expressed serious concerns with experts’ partisan opinions and the 
impact on trials.
42
  Public sentiment about the use of experts “produced a 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Mnookin applies Roscoe Pound's account of the “sporting theory of justice” to the 
nineteenth century evidentiary regime. See Mnookin, supra note 10, at 1015 (citing Roscoe 
Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 14 AM. L. 
445, 447-48 (1906)). 
 38. See Dillon, supra note 28, at 258 (“[P]utative expert testimony was freely 
admissible and cross-examination served as the principal check against spurious claims of 
epistemic authority.”).  This was Justice White’s rationale for admitting the testimony of Dr. 
Grigson in Barefoot v. Estelle.  See 463 U.S. 880, 898 (1983) (explaining that jurors “have 
the benefit of cross-examination and contrary evidence by the opposing party”). 
 39. Mnookin, supra note 10, at 1015. 
 40. See, e.g., GOLAN, supra note 23, at 255 (“[A]t [the 1897 New Hampshire Medical 
Society] annual meeting, Judge William Foster opened his address with a joke popular 
within legal circles: ‘There are three kinds of liars: the common liar, the damned liar, and the 
scientific expert.’”). 
 41. McCormick v. Talcott, 61 U.S. 402, 409 (1857) (Daniel, J., dissenting). One year 
later, the Court complained that “opposite opinions of persons professing to be experts may 
be obtained to any amount” and that experts are often “perplexing, instead of elucidating, the 
questions involved in the issue.”  Winans v. N.Y. & Erie R.R. Co., 62 U.S. 88, 101 (1858).   
 42. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Hubbel, 97 N.Y. 507, 514 (1884) (stating that the expert 
witnesses' “opinions cannot fail generally to be warped by a desire to promote the cause in 
which they are enlisted”).  An 1899 Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion fumed: 
[S]killed witnesses come with such a bias on their minds that hardly any weight 
should be given to their evidence. It seems that if a person is called as a witness 
to support one side of a controversy by opinion evidence, he is quite likely to 
espouse such side with all the zeal of blind partisanship, to view the situation 
from the point of interest and necessity of that one side of the controversy with 
such a degree of mental concentration as to shut out of view everything not 
within that narrow focus, inducing a mental condition of entire incapability of 
giving an independent, impartial opinion, and capability only of acting in the 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss3/3
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crisis of confidence in the courts.”43  They were “denounced in legal 
journals and by the popular press . . . and lambasted for being partisan 
‘hired guns . . . .’”44  The marketplace test was no longer a sufficient means 
to qualify an expert.
45
 
B. Frye v. United States–A New Test to Judge Expert Testimony 
When viewed from this historical perspective, Frye v. United States
46
 
seems like an inevitable move by the courts to place limits on the 
                                                                                                                 
line which the interest of the one side suggests, with as much certainty as the 
hypnotized follows the mental suggestion of the hypnotizer.   
Baxter v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 80 N.W. 644, 653 (Wis. 1899); see also DAVID H. KAYE, 
DAVID E. BERNSTEIN & JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON 
EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE, § 1.3, Westlaw (2d ed. 2018) (“It is amazing the number of 
hard things which the courts of last resort have said about expert testimony; a volume quite 
as large as the Illinois Statutes could be compiled of condemnatory phrases and language.” 
(quoting Arthur J. Eddy, What Reforms in the Nature of Expert Testimony Are Advisable?, 
58 ALB. L.J. 251, 251 (1898))); see also E. E. S. Wood, Medical Testimony, 7 AM. LAW. 92, 
94 (1899) (noting that “cases condemning the value of expert witnesses and cautioning the 
jury against paying much attention to their opinion, are so numerous that they form an entire 
literature”). 
 43. Dillon, supra note 28, at 258.  Indeed, perceived abuses by experts in the courtroom 
and “experts' status as partisan witnesses placed them in adversarial positions that 
undermined the public's confidence in scientific objectivity.”  Id.  As one lawyer wrote in 
1899, the testimony of experts “is the subject of everybody's sneer and the object of 
everybody's derision. It has become a newspaper jest.  The public has no confidence in 
expert testimony.”  KAYE, BERNSTEIN & MNOOKIN, supra note 42 (quoting Henry Wollman, 
“Physicians-Expert Witnesses.” “Some Reforms.”, 17 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 20, 20 (1899)). 
 44. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Idealizing Science and Demonizing Experts: An Intellectual 
History of Expert Evidence, 52 VILL. L. REV. 763, 771 (2007).  In an 1897 address to the 
New Hampshire Medical Society, Judge William Foster reported that expert witness 
partisanship “or inclination in favor of the party by whom the witness is employed, is 
probably the most frequent complaint of all against the expert witness.”  William L. Foster, 
Expert Testimony – Prevalent Complaints and Proposed Remedies, 11 HARV. L. REV. 169, 
171 (1897).   
 45. See Saks, supra note 31, at 137 (“One problem is that the market can tell us only 
what people select; it cannot tell us whether what they select is any good.  Thus, for 
example, the marketplace test is incapable of distinguishing astronomy from astrology.  The 
market values both.  Commercial value is not a measure of scientific or any other kind of 
validity.  Another problem is that some fields have little or no life in any commercial 
marketplace.  That is true of cutting-edge knowledge which has yet to develop a market for 
itself, and of fields that have little or no function outside of their possible courtroom utility 
(sometimes signaled by the adjective ‘forensic,’ as in ‘forensic science’).”). 
 46. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by statute, FED. R. EVID. 702, as 
recognized in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993). 
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admissibility of expert witness testimony.
47
  By the time of the Frye 
decision in 1923, the problems with relying on merely the relevance of the 
testimony or the reputation of the expert “led the D.C. Circuit to reconsider 
the standard for admissibility of expert evidence.”48  In imposing a new 
standard for courts to use when assessing expert witness testimony, the 
D.C. Circuit started a slow but monumental shift in how experts were 
handled in the courtroom.
49
  As Professor Jill Lepore explains, Frye “held 
sway for seven decades, remains the standard in several states, and 
continues to influence federal law.”50   
Frye’s critical role in shaping the law on expert witness testimony, 
however, should not obscure the compelling facts and history of the case 
and the parties involved.
51
  The Frye case is named for James Alphonzo 
Frye, whose appeal of his second-degree murder conviction was denied in 
the famous decision that now bears his name.
52
  Frye had confessed to the 
                                                                                                                 
 47. See Dillon, supra note 28, at 259 (“The D.C. Circuit's 1923 decision in Frye v. 
United States was an early effort to constrain the free-for-all sporting theory . . . .”). 
 48. Andrew Jurs & Scott DeVito, The Stricter Standard: An Empirical Assessment of 
Daubert's Effect on Civil Defendants, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 675, 682 (2013); see also Michael 
J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Formative Encounters with Forensic 
Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1074 (1998) (explaining that the flaws of the 
commercial marketplace test necessitated the Frye standard). 
 49. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993) (“In the 70 
years since its formulation in the Frye case, the ‘general acceptance’ test has been the 
dominant standard for determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence at trial.”) 
(citations omitted); see also GOLAN, supra note 23, at 253 (explaining Frye “was accepted 
for most of the twentieth century as the standard of the admissibility of new scientific 
evidence in practically all of America’s courts” and its “exclusionary rationale [has] been 
able to dominate American legal thought ever since”). 
 50. Jill Lepore, On Evidence: Proving Frye as a Matter of Law, Science, and History, 
124 YALE L.J. 1092, 1096 (2015).   
 51. See id. at 1149 (“[T]he facts behind Frye reveal just how great has been the tension, 
and how wide the gap, between ideas about evidence in history, science, and the law.”).  Yet 
as Professor Lepore laments, “Only a handful of scholars—historians of science—have ever 
investigated the case.”  Id. at 1141.  Some have taken notice since, however.  Professor 
Lepore’s thorough history of the Frye case has been recognized as a must-read for anyone 
interested in expert witness jurisprudence.  See e.g., Dillon, supra note 28, at 259 n.31 
(encouraging readers to review her “engaging history” of the particular facts of Frye). 
 52. Frye v. United States, 293 F. at 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by statute, 
FED. R. EVID. 702, as recognized in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587; see also Lepore, supra note 
50, at 1149 (recounting the efforts of Frye to clear his name of the conviction even years 
after his parole, all of which were unsuccessful).  
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police but later tried to retract his admission.
53
  The trial judge refused to 
allow an expert witness to testify about Frye’s truthfulness in recanting his 
admission.
54
  The defense was planning to call the expert to testify about 
the results of Frye’s use of a “systolic blood pressure deception test” (an 
earlier version of a lie detector test), which apparently verified the truth of 
Frye’s story.55  The use of the deception test was the last viable defense 
Frye’s counsel had available.56  Frye was found guilty.  
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court focused entirely on the exclusion of 
the expert witness and his deception test.
57
  In discussing admissibility, the 
court recognized that "when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the 
line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to 
define.”58  Nonetheless, the court went on: 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Lepore, supra note 50, at 1120.  The trial judge had refused to accept the lie detector 
test as sufficiently established: “When it is developed to the perfection of the telephone and 
the telegraph and wireless and a few other things we will consider it.  I shall be dead by that 
time, probably, and it will bother some other judge, not me.”  Id. at 1132 (quoting the trial 
transcript). 
 54. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.  In one of the more interesting features of the Frye case 
backstory, the defense’s expert, William Marston, would later go on to write the Wonder 
Woman comic strip.  JILL LEPORE, THE SECRET HISTORY OF WONDER WOMAN 73 (2014) 
(noting this detail is “[a]mong the many facts about the Frye case that have never been 
discovered by anyone who has ever cited or studied it”). 
 55. Frye, 293 F. at 1013-14.  Frye’s counsel had initially encouraged Frye to plead 
guilty and had engaged the expert and his deception test to show Frye that his attempt to lie 
would be detected.  Instead, Frye passed the deception test with flying colors, as the machine 
confirmed (in its way) that Frye was telling the truth.  GOLAN, supra note 23, at 246.  
 56. Frye’s counsel was apparently desperate for any kind of defense.   GOLAN, supra 
note 23, at 246 (“Unable to find a single witness to support Frye’s alleged alibi, or a way to 
discredit Frye’s detailed confession, not to mention the testimony of at least one eye witness, 
[defense counsel Richard] Mattingly made a desperate though imaginative move and 
contacted William Marston.”). 
 57. See Frye, 293 F. at 1013-14; see also Lepore, supra note 50, at 1124 (“[Defense 
counsel] Mattingly and [Lester] Wood based their defense on establishing that Frye's 
confession was a lie, and that, in disavowing it, Frye was telling the truth.”).  The deception 
test supposedly worked by measuring the subject’s blood pressure.  See id. at 1113. “It is 
asserted,” wrote the court, “that blood pressure is influenced by change in the emotions of 
the witness, and that the systolic blood pressure rises are brought about by nervous impulses 
sent to the sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system.”  Frye, 293 F. at 1013.  
The court characterized the deception test evidence as a “theory,” finding that “truth is 
spontaneous, and comes without conscious effort, while the utterance of a falsehood requires 
a conscious effort, which is reflected in the blood pressure.”  Id. at 1014. 
 58. Id. 
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Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the 
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long 
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from 
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to 
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it 
belongs.
59
  
The court ultimately ruled that use of the deception test “ha[s] not yet 
gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and 
psychological authorities” to justify its admission as evidence.60  Based on 
this reasoning, the court upheld the exclusion of the evidence and Frye's 
conviction.
61
 
C. The Lasting Impact of Frye 
The appellate court’s “cryptic” decision used only a total of 669 words 
and did not make “a single reference to case law or precedent, nor any 
references to scientific literature.”62  Despite these unusual features, Frye 
became the default standard as state and federal courts around the country 
began to follow Frye's “general acceptance” test.63  Indeed, the court 
established a standard that still stands in numerous state courts.
64
  The Frye 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Lepore, supra note 50, at 1140. 
 63. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993); Bert Black et 
al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert : A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 
72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 726 (1994) (“This notion of a special rule for scientific evidence 
originated [with Frye].”) (citing 1 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 
203 (4th ed. 1992)). 
 64. See Barbara Pfeffer Billauer, Daubert Debunked: A History of Legal Retrogression 
and the Need to Reassess “Scientific Admissibility,” 21 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1, 
11 (2015-2016) [hereinafter Billauer, Daubert Debunked] (describing how the “the ghost of 
Frye still hangs heavy on the courts” as it is “still good law in eight jurisdictions at last count 
(although the number is constantly changing) along with the District of Columbia”); see also 
David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the General 
Acceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICS 385, 386–87, nn.7–23 (2001) (referencing the decisions of 
seventeen states as supporting the assertion that “[m]any jurisdictions continue to adhere to 
Frye” (citing S. Energy Homes, Inc. v. Washington, 774 So. 2d 505, 517 n.5 (Ala. 2000); 
Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113 (Ariz. 2000); State v. Johnson, 922 P.2d 294 (Ariz. 1996); 
State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152 (Ariz. 1993); People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994); 
Lindsey v. People, 892 P.2d 281 (Colo. 1995); Nixon v. United States, 728 A.2d 582, 588 
(D.C. 1999); Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1993); People v. Miller, 670 N.E.2d 
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decision became “the controlling test for the admissibility of scientific and 
technical evidence for much of the twentieth century.”65  By the late 1970s, 
at least one state supreme court recognized that “[t]he Frye test ha[d] been 
accepted as the standard in practically all of the courts of this country which 
have considered the question of the admissibility of new scientific 
evidence.”66  
Yet a closer look at the legal history of Frye tells a slightly different, and 
more complicated, story.  While held out today as one of the most 
important cases in all of evidence, much less expert witness admissibility,
67
 
the reality is that the Frye test “went unnoticed for decades.”68  Even Judge 
Van Orsdel, the judge who wrote the Frye opinion, ignored his own ruling 
in another important scientific evidence case he handed down on the very 
same day.
69
  The Frye opinion did not receive a citation in any circuit court 
                                                                                                                 
721, 731 (Ill. 1996); State v. Heath, 957 P.2d 449 (Kan. 1998); Hutton v. State, 663 A.2d 
1289 (Md. 1995); DePyper v. Navarro, 1995 WL 788828, at *34 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Nov. 27, 
1995); Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 2000); Gleeton v. State, 716 So. 2d 
1083 (Miss. 1998); State v. Carter, 524 N.W.2d 763 (Neb. 1994); Phillips v. Indus. Machine, 
597 N.W.2d 377, 389 (Neb. 1999) (Gerrard, J., concurring); State v. Harvey, 699 A.2d 596 
(N.J. 1997); People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 454 n.2 (N.Y. 1994); Commonwealth v. 
Blasioli, 713 A.2d 1117 (Pa. 1998); State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304, 1310 (Wash. 1996))). 
 65. Dillon, supra note 28, at 259; see also Lepore, supra note 50, at 1140 (citation 
omitted) (“Frye's ‘general acceptance’ test wasn't meaningfully challenged until Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals in 1993 . . . .”). 
 66. Id. at 1140 (quoting State v. Miller, 732 P.2d 756, 759 (1987)). 
 67. See, e.g., id. at 1096 (describing Frye as “one of the most influential rules of 
evidence in the history of American law”). 
 68. Saks, supra note 31, at 139.  No federal or state court cited Frye for at least ten 
years.  Id. at 139.  In fact, the only uses of Frye in the first three decades after the decision 
were in criminal cases to exclude from trial “various lie detection and truth serum schemes.”  
GOLAN, supra note 23, at 259.  During its first twenty-five years, “Frye was cited in only 
eight federal cases and five state cases.  During its second quarter-century, it was cited 54 
times in federal cases and 29 times in state cases.”  Saks, supra note 31, at 139.  But see 
Bernstein, supra note 64, at 388-89 (“[T]he dearth of citations to Frye does not mean that 
courts ignored it.  First, some courts adopted the general acceptance test without citing Frye.  
Second, Frye applied only to novel scientific techniques.  There were few major advances in 
forensic criminal evidence during this period that courts did not quickly accept.”); Black et 
al., supra note 63, at 722 n.30 (“The ever-increasing use of scientific evidence is reflected in 
ever-increasing citations to Frye.  After World War II, the case was only cited 6 times before 
1950, 20 times during the 1950s, 21 times during the 1960s, 100 times during the 1970s, 470 
time[s] during the 1980s, and 350 times in the early 1990s.”).   
 69. Saks, supra note 31, at 139 (citing Laney v. United States, 294 F. 412 (D.C. Cir. 
1923) (ruling on the admissibility of firearms identification)).  The court in Laney “not only 
made no use of the Frye test, it made no mention of it, and did not explain why it was not 
applied or applicable to the novel question of firearms identification.”  Id. at 139 n.23.  
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case until 1984.
70
  Courts did not start using the Frye test regularly until the 
mid-1970s, about the time of the codification of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.
71
  Heavier use of the Frye test, somewhat paradoxically,
72
 took 
place after the Federal Rules were adopted.
73
  By the 1980s, “Frye was 
being cited as much [on a yearly basis] as it had been in its first 50 years 
added together.”74   
At this same time, however, prominent evidence scholars reported that 
“the (Frye) general acceptance test has been rejected by an increasing 
number of courts, and attacked by commentators, who have labeled the test 
                                                                                                                 
Moreover, a leading state supreme court had that same year denied admissibility to firearms 
identification.  People v. Berkman, 139 N.E. 91 (Ill. 1923).  As Professor Saks surmises, 
“Perhaps Judge Van Orsdel foreshadowed later judges by using the Frye test merely as a 
legal tool to be used or not used depending on the outcome desired.”  Saks, supra note 31, at 
139 n.23.  
 70.  See Michael H. Gottesman, From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or 
Double Error?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 755 n.11 (1998) (noting that “the first such appellate 
decision appear[ed] to be Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 739 F.2d 
1028, 1031 (5th Cir. 1984)”).   
 71. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595 (1975) (codified at FED. R. EVID. 702 
(1975)).  Rule 702, as originally adopted, stated that “[i]f scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine 
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”  FED. R. EVID. 702 
(1975) (amended 2011). 
 72. See Barrel of Fun, 739 F.2d at 1031 n.9 (“Although this Court has noted that it is an 
unresolved question whether the Federal Rules of Evidence silently abolished or adopted the 
Frye test, we have continued to utilize Frye's ‘general scientific acceptability’ criteria.” 
(citations omitted)); see also David M. Flores et al., Examining the Effects of the Daubert 
Trilogy on Expert Evidence Practices in Federal Civil Court: An Empirical Analysis, 34 S. 
ILL. U. L.J. 533, 534-35 (2010) (“While the adoption of [Federal Rule of Evidence 702] did 
not specifically preclude the use of the general acceptance rule in the evaluation of expert 
testimony, questions arose about the continued applicability of Frye.”). 
 73. Saks, supra note 31, at 139.  But see Billauer, Admissibility, supra note 1, at 29 n.44 
(citing LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CHANGES IN THE 
STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT 
DECISION (2001), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/ 
MR1439.pdf) (referencing an empirical study that found that the “general acceptance” test 
was used by courts only rarely (5% of the sample cases) between 1980 and 1993 and became 
much more prominent after the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert). 
 74. Saks, supra note 31, at 139; see also Lepore, supra note 50, at 1096 (“On the matter 
of expert testimony, few cases are more cited than Frye.”); id. at 1096 n.26 (citing Robert 
Schriek, Most-Cited U.S. Courts of Appeals Cases from 1932 Until the Late 1980s, 83 LAW. 
LIB. J. 317, 330 (1991)) (noting that Frye “is only one of two pre-1932 cases to rank in his 
study”). 
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‘infamous,’ ‘a sport,’ ‘archaic,’ and ‘antiquated on the day of its 
pronouncement.’”75  The concerns about Frye rested on its seeming reliance 
on the old “sporting theory” and the trust that the adversarial system was 
robust enough on its own to protect the courts from unqualified science.
76
  
There was also confusion among judges on these issues, which led to 
contradictory Frye rulings in different jurisdictions concerning the same 
types of evidence.
77
  Things were about to get more serious. 
II. The Road to Daubert 
A. The Rise of “Junk Science” 
While contradictions were piling up in lower courts over how to address 
the standards for admitting expert testimony, there was also a growing 
perception that large cases involving complex science were overwhelming 
federal courts.
78
  Vice President Dan Quayle wrote in 1992 that federal civil 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Gottesman, supra note 70, at 755 n.11 (citing PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. 
IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 13-14 (1986)). 
 76. Mnookin, supra note 10, at 1016; see also Bernstein, supra note 64, at 390 
(“Commentators began to attack Frye on a variety of grounds.  Some argued that Frye was 
too conservative in restricting evidence that had not yet received ‘general acceptance.’  
Others were unhappy with Frye’s vagueness.  The opinion does not define ‘general 
acceptance’ or the ‘particular field’s’ boundaries, nor does it suggest whether the judge 
should defer to the scientific community or use another standard to resolve these 
uncertainties.  Confusion among judges on these issues led to contradictory Frye rulings in 
different jurisdictions concerning the same types of evidence.”).  Indeed, some recent 
scholarship argues that courts maintained a laissez-faire attitude toward gatekeeping until the 
early 1990s.  See JACK FISHER, SILICONE ON TRIAL: BREAST IMPLANTS AND THE POLITICS OF 
RISK 222 (2015).  
 77. Bernstein, supra note 64, at 390. 
 78. These claims were certainly overblown.  See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Reading the 
Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our 
Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 71 (1983) (analyzing data 
and arguing in 1983 that claims that America is experiencing a “litigation explosion” rely on 
scholarship and analysis that are “thin and spotty”); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact 
Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 442 n.54 
(1986) (noting that “dramatic increases in litigation are hardly unprecedented” and 
“empirical investigation suggests that the current preoccupation with the litigation ‘boom’ 
may be an overreaction”); Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1909 (1989) 
(doubting the existence of a litigation explosion and noting in 1989 that federal judges had 
approximately the same number of cases then as they had in 1960).  But it is true that the 
high point in the number of civil trials in federal court was in the mid-1980s, the period of 
time when these claims were becoming pronounced.  Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year 
Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1264 (2005).  Part of the 
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litigation had almost quadrupled between 1960 and 1990, and that, in 1989 
alone, eighteen million new lawsuits were filed, amounting to one lawsuit 
for every ten American adults.
79
  One prominent study reported that a 
“dramatic growth” in toxic torts and environmental litigation put unique 
strain on the court system, which had to both adjudicate difficult legal 
issues and resolve questions of new and complex science.
80
    
The prime concern was the rising “epidemic of toxic tort cases.”81  The 
emergence of mass toxic tort litigation in the 1980s allegedly resulted in 
                                                                                                                 
perception of a “litigation explosion” may have been fueled by the very real growth in the 
number of lawyers.  As the then-dean of Harvard Law School humorously opined:  
In 1960, there was one lawyer for every 627 people in the United States. In 
1988, there was one lawyer for every 339 people.  During the last half of this 
twenty-eight year period, the number of lawyers in the United States increased 
at a rate that was more than five times faster than the rate of growth for the 
general population. . . .  I calculate that if we keep going in this way, by the 
year 2023 there will be more lawyers than people.   
Robert C. Clark, Why So Many Lawyers? Are They Good or Bad?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 
275, 276 (1992). 
 79. Quayle, supra note 5, at 560.  As with much of the data used at the time to support 
the notion that the courts were overrun, the Vice President's statistics were immediately 
criticized as inaccurate and misleading.  See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the 
American Legal System: The Council on Competitiveness' Agenda for Legal Reform, 75 
JUDICATURE 244, 245 (1992) (reviewing the data and concluding that “its empirical 
underpinning is shaky” and “at best incomplete and at worst misleading”).  Despite his 
reliance on shaky data, the Vice President made expert testimony a particular target of 
reform.  See infra notes 95–99 and accompanying text (outlining the history of the 
administration’s reform efforts). 
 80. According to the study by the Carnegie Foundation, this “dramatic growth in toxic 
torts and environmental litigation has put new pressure on the legal system, which is 
simultaneously being asked to adjudicate issues on the cutting edge of science and to 
develop theories of substantive law.”  CARNEGIE COMM'N ON SCI., TECH. & GOV'T, SCIENCE 
AND TECHNOLOGY IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 10 (Mar. 1993) [hereinafter CARNEGIE 
COMM'N].  The pressure is particularly “intense because of the large numbers of people that 
are involved and the profound social, economic, and public policy concerns that these new 
legal claims raise.”  Id.; see also Bernstein, supra note 64, at 390 (“As debate grew over the 
merits of Frye, the relevancy approach, and the reliability approach with regard to forensic 
criminal evidence, courts faced a new evidentiary challenge—toxic tort litigation.”).  
 81. Billauer, Daubert Debunked, supra note 64, at 24 (observing that Asbestos and 
Dalkon Shield were “the most notorious”); see FISHER, supra note 76, at 205 (detailing the 
complex history of silicone breast implant litigation). Some of the increased litigation 
stemmed from legitimate anger by the public toward large companies’ insensitivities to the 
dangers of their products.  Billauer, Daubert Debunked, supra note 64, at 24.  For example, 
“what inflamed the asbestos litigation were reckless statements by company managers and 
reckless conduct of the early manufacturers.”  Id. (citing Mealey's Litig. Rep.: Asbestos, July 
27, 1984, at 982).  In the 1960s, an executive for a company that used asbestos in its 
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enormous payouts and unsurprisingly inspired “loud complaints from 
industry and insurance groups.”82  Cases involving chemical manufacturers, 
pharmaceutical companies, and health care workers received the most 
attention, and everyone from industry heads to elected officials “argued that 
the profitability and viability of production and manufacturing in the United 
States were under serious attack.”83 
The main complaint was that questionable science was leading to 
erroneous jury verdicts.  One paradigm issue was the silicone implant.  
While no legitimate medical science ever substantiated any causal 
connection between implants and serious health conditions,
84
 by the early 
1990s six thousand plaintiffs signed up in state courts and four thousand 
more in federal courts against the major corporations of the silicone implant 
industry.
85
  Despite the lack of scientific evidence, the silicone litigation 
became “an industry in itself.”86  By 1993 (the year of Daubert), “the four 
                                                                                                                 
products wrote a letter that was widely circulated and became the spark for many punitive 
damages awards.  Id. at 24 n.111. In the letter, the executive wrote, “My answer to the 
problem is:  If you have enjoyed a good life working with asbestos products, why not die 
from it?  There has to be some cause [of death].”  Id.  As Professor Billauer notes, “The 
public had been sensitized to cavalier pronouncements by the ‘them that has’ and were 
primed for revenge, and the plaintiff's bar took advantage of this societal state of mind.”  Id. 
at 24. 
 82. Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Trashing “Junk Science,” 1998 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 3, 6. 
 83. Id.  Vice President Quale argued that “[t]he use of litigation as a preferred means in 
our society for resolving disputes and achieving social reforms has burdened the courts and 
has resulted in significant economic detriment.”  Quayle, supra note 5, at 568.  Industry 
executives apparently felt the same way.  See id. at 561 (“[A] survey of over 250 American 
companies revealed that more than three-quarters of the executives believe that the United 
States will be increasingly disadvantaged in world markets unless modifications are made in 
the liability system.”).  
 84. In 1996, a judicially appointed National Science Panel found “that there is no 
meaningful or consistent association between silicone gel-filled implants and any of the 
conditions studied.”  Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F. 3d 878, 882 (10th Cir. 2005); 
see also Daniel Q. Posin, Silicone Breast Implant Litigation and My Father-in-Law: A Neo-
Coasen Analysis, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2565, 2571-72 (1996) (“Certainly, at the time the silicone 
breast litigation explosion commenced (in 1990) there was no evidence that silicone breast 
implants did any more than cause localized inflammation and tissue hardening.”). 
 85. Billauer, Daubert Debunked, supra note 64, at 24-25. 
 86. Posin, supra note 84, at 2571; see also In re Silica Prod. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 
2d 563, 634 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“[A]ssembly line diagnosing . . . is an ingenious method of 
grossly inflating the number of positive diagnoses.”); Erica Beecher-Monas, Lost in 
Translation: Statistical Inference in Court, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1077 (2014) (discussing 
the admission of “highly suspect mass medical screenings by a few doctors for litigation 
rather than treatment purposes” as specific causation testimony, often without challenge). 
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major implant manufacturers jointly announced that they had collectively 
set aside 4.75 billion dollars to settle claims filed over the next thirty 
years.”87  And many companies would decide to get out of the implant 
business altogether.
88
    
The silicone implant litigation was only the tip of the iceberg, according 
to the many critics
89
 who had by then embraced a new, powerful phrase 
meant to get at the heart of the issue: “junk science.”90  That single two-
word dysphemism became a rallying cry, made prominent in the best-
selling book by Peter Huber, Galileo’s Revenge.91  Despite many 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Billauer, Daubert Debunked, supra note 64, at 24-25. 
 88. Until protected by later federal legislation, some suppliers stopped producing the 
material used in medical devices in order to avoid being sued.  Phil Goldberg, Christopher E. 
Appel & Victor E. Schwartz, The Liability Engine That Could Not: Why the Decades-Long 
Litigation Pursuit of Natural Resource Suppliers Should Grind to a Halt, 12 J.L. ECON. & 
POL'Y 47, 59 (2016); see also Posin, supra note 84, at 2572 (“Many of the large suppliers of 
silicone and other related compounds, including Dow Chemical, Du Pont, and Dow Corning, 
have decided to stop making plastics for medical implants because of the breast implant 
litigation.”).  The ripple effects of these decisions were potentially enormous.  See Jack W. 
Snyder, Silicone Breast Implants: Can Emerging Medical, Legal, and Scientific Concepts Be 
Reconciled?, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 133, 136 (1997) (stating that “over 500 medical products 
contain measurable amounts of silicone”). 
 89. Perhaps ironically, some of the earliest calls for a crackdown on questionable expert 
testimony in toxic torts cases came from editorials in traditionally liberal publications, such 
as the New England Journal of Medicine and the New York Times.  David E. Bernstein & 
Eric G. Lasker, Defending Daubert: It's Time to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 57 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 10 (2015) (citing James L. Mills & Duane Alexander, Occasional 
Notes: Teratogens and “Litogens,” 315 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1234, 1234-35 (1986); Opinion, 
Federal Judges vs. Science, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 1986), https://www.nytimes.com/1986/12/ 
27/opinion/federal-judges-vs-science.html).  These editorials expressed particular concern 
about “how bogus lawsuits were jeopardizing access to contraception, in particular after a 
notorious case in which the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a $5 million award to a plaintiff who 
alleged that his mother's use of a common spermicide had caused his birth defects.”  Id. at 10 
(citing Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 742-43, 747-48 (11th Cir. 1986)). 
 90. Most agree that the term “junk science” seems to have emerged in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s.  See Edmond & Mercer, supra note 82, at 4 (“It received its initial impetus 
and articulation in the polemical works of Peter Huber of the Manhattan Institute, a 
conservative think-tank supported by various industry and insurance groups.”).  Former 
Attorney General Dick Thornburgh, Attorney General under President George H. W. Bush, 
offered his own definition.  See Dick Thornburgh, Junk Science-The Lawyer's Ethical 
Responsibilities, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 449, 449 (1998) (“I hold that ‘junk science’ in the 
courtroom emanates from testimony by expert witnesses hired not for their scientific 
expertise, but for their willingness, for a price, to say whatever is needed to make the client's 
case.”).   
 91. See HUBER, supra note 3, at 2-3; see also Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo's Retort: 
Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637, 1642 (1993) (“Galileo's Revenge 
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questionable declarations and dubious science,
92
 Huber’s book was 
embraced by policy-makers, lawyers, and the media.
93
 The rising problem 
of “junk science” became a topic of mainstream public debate, as the book 
attracted a great deal of attention.
94
  
 Huber’s influence extended to the administration at the time.95  The 
President's Council on Competitiveness, which was chaired by Vice 
President Dan Quayle, instituted the Civil Justice Reform Task Force to 
target expert testimony.
96
  Vice President Quayle became an outspoken 
advocate for reforming the way in which courts evaluate expert witness 
testimony, claiming that “uncontrolled use of expert witnesses . . . has also 
allowed ‘junk science’ to tarnish the legal process.”97  The Vice President 
specifically, and inaccurately, used anecdotes from Huber’s book.  For 
example, the Vice President cites one of the most sensational examples of 
“junk science” involving a “soothsayer” who, “with the backing of expert 
testimony from a doctor and several police department officials,” won a 
million-dollar jury award due to the loss of “her psychic powers following a 
CAT scan,” without acknowledging that the verdict in that case was thrown 
                                                                                                                 
and its author have received heavy publicity and have been treated by lawyers as well as 
laypeople as if they were part of legitimate scholarship on these issues.”). 
 92. See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text (cataloging the many concerns about 
the data and assertions in the book by numerous commentators). 
 93. See Chesebro, supra note 91, at 1642 (“Galileo's Revenge and Huber's other 
writings have been widely cited by lawyers, lobbyists, and even former Vice President Dan 
Quayle, and have been glowingly reviewed by lay writers.”).  The mainstream media was 
particularly fond of Huber and his book.  See id. at 1647 (“The lay press, for the most part, 
has seen Huber as an unalloyed precious metal.”). 
 94. See Bernstein, supra note 64, at 391 (“A consistent theme of the book was that to 
avoid the risk of being bamboozled by fringe scientists, courts should defer to mainstream 
scientific opinion when reviewing scientific evidence.”).   
 95. See Jeff L. Lewin, Calabresi's Revenge? Junk Science in the Work of Peter Huber, 
21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183, 185 (1992) (“The administration at the time certainly took notice 
of Huber’s work and relied on it for their own attacks on the growing use of courts for toxic 
tort plaintiffs.”). 
 96. Giannelli, supra note 5, at 109.  The Solicitor General at the time, Kenneth Starr, 
chaired the Task Force.  Id. at 109 n.24.  To review this report, see PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON 
COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA (Aug. 1991), reprinted 
in 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 979 (1992).  
 97. Quayle, supra note 5, at 565.  According to the Vice President, “‘Expert’ witnesses 
regularly offer their ‘scientific’ opinions on the connections between automobile accidents 
and breast cancer or environmental pollutants and ‘chemically induced AIDS.’”  Id. at 566 
(citing HUBER, supra note 3, at 4). 
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out by the trial judge.
98
  Building on the Vice President’s efforts, “[t]he 
1992 Republican platform included a promise to ‘throw out “junk science”’ 
from American courtrooms.”99   
Courts, too, were getting in on the act advising against the use of “junk 
science.”100  Indeed, the Ninth Circuit, in the decision later reversed by the 
Supreme Court in Daubert, specifically cited Huber's book in rejecting the 
testimony of plaintiffs' experts.
101
  But the larger issues for the courts at the 
time were the perceived “attitude of judicial laissez-faire” when it came to 
admitting “expert testimony from “just about anyone the plaintiffs chose to 
designate . . . even persons without relevant training, credential or 
experience.”102  Throughout the mid-1980s, courts “typically applied a very 
lenient standard to the admissibility of expert testimony.”103  Equally 
problematic, courts were applying different standards to toxic torts cases.  
Some courts applied a loose “reliability test” to such evidence.104  Other 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Id.  But see Giannelli, supra note 5, at 108 n.16 (“Vice President Quayle cites this 
example without including the next sentence.  Huber's next sentence is: ‘The trial judge 
threw out that verdict.’” (citing HUBER, supra note 3, at 4)).  Instead, the Vice President 
writes that such stories “are becoming almost commonplace.”  Quayle, supra note 5, at 566.  
 99. Lewin, supra note 95, at 185. 
 100. See, e.g., Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210, 215 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“[T]he district judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting 
the testimony.  Perceptual psychology (a part of experimental psychology) is not ‘junk 
science,’ and Professor Walker is no quack.”). 
 101. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The 
best test of certainty we have is good science—the science of publication, replication, and 
verification, the science of consensus and peer review.” (quoting HUBER, supra note 3, at 
228)); see also Thomas M. Crowley, Help Me Mr. Wizard! Can We Really Have “Neutral” 
Rule 706 Experts?, 1998 DET. C.L. REV. 927, 935 n.34 (“Given the circuit's opinion, and the 
22 amicus briefs filed in the [later Supreme Court] case, representing a range of parties from 
the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and Government to the American Tort 
Reform Association (referring explicitly to junk science), the Daubert court was 
undoubtedly aware of the larger societal issues at stake.”). 
 102. Billauer, Daubert Debunked, supra note 64, at 26; see also FISHER, supra note 76, at 
222. 
 103. Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 89, at 4.  Even when courts “purported to apply a 
seemingly strict reliability test,” they usually allowed the testimony of the expert to be 
admitted.  See Bernstein, supra note 64, at 390 (citing, as but two examples, In re Paoli R.R. 
Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 911 F.2d 
941 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
 104. See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1246 
(E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[C]ourts look to 
evidence from experts in the field about the reliability of the materials in question . . . .”). 
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courts applied versions of a relevancy test.
105
  Until 1988, no toxic tort case 
applied the Frye test, which until then was nearly exclusively used in 
criminal cases.
106
  By 1993, the year of Daubert, “the Supreme Court got 
the message: [s]omething needed to be done.”107  
Before moving on to Daubert, it is interesting to ask, were “the courts 
really overrun with ‘junk science’?”  “Not only are there no studies that 
support” the allegation,108 but a Carnegie Commission report on Science, 
Technology, and Government released at the time “concluded that, as for 
the ‘allegations that “junk science” is flooding the courtroom, . . . many of 
the concerns are greatly exaggerated’ and ‘it does not appear that the 
federal courts are being inundated with fringe science.’”109  Huber’s 
infamous book itself was heavily criticized as “junk science”110 and overly 
reliant on anecdotal evidence.
111
  Huber and others’ use of junk science to 
                                                                                                                 
 105. See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1536 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(“[T]he test for allowing a plaintiff to recover in a tort suit of this type is not scientific 
certainty but legal sufficiency; if reasonable jurors could conclude from the expert testimony 
that paraquat more likely than not caused Ferebee's injury, the fact that . . . science would 
require more evidence before conclusively considering the causation question resolved is 
irrelevant.”). 
 106. See Bernstein, supra note 64, at 390 (“Until 1988, no court applied Frye—which 
was mainly limited to forensic evidence in criminal trials—in a toxic tort case.”). 
 107. Billauer, Daubert Debunked, supra note 64, at 27 (referencing personal meeting 
with Chief Justice Rehnquist). 
 108. Chesebro, supra note 91, at 1653 (quoting CARNEGIE COMM'N, supra note 80, at 13).  
 109. Id. (quoting CARNEGIE COMM'N, supra note 80, at 13).  
 110. See, e.g., Chesebro, supra note 91, at 1726 (using Huber’s own terms in asserting 
that “the errors in Huber's factual description and legal analysis are so frequent and profound 
that Galileo would go further to repudiate Huber's book—on Huber's own terms—as ‘a 
catalog of every conceivable kind of error: data dredging, wishful thinking, truculent 
dogmatism, and, now and again, outright fraud’”); Edmond & Mercer, supra note 82, at 10 
(criticizing the “limitations of the junk science model, focusing particular attention on the 
simplistic, idealized, and frequently erroneous images of science employed by the model's 
proponents”); Lewin, supra note 95, at 203-04 (“Huber harnesses the power of junk 
litigation science to stir up fear of the tort system, purveying the pernicious myth that junk 
science is rampant in our courts and that liability frequently is imposed without a well-
founded scientific basis.”); Book Note, Rebel Without a Cause, 105 HARV. L. REV. 935, 940 
(1992) (reviewing Huber’s book) (“[I]t is imperative to disentangle Huber's two criticisms: 
one evidentiary, against junk science; the other policy-oriented, against modern substantive 
tort law.”). 
 111. Lewin, supra note 95, at 189.  As Professor Lewin explains, 
At the core of the work are over 100 pages of horror stories about the legal 
system's mishandling of scientifically untenable claims that various persons or 
entities were the cause of the victims' damages.  Compounding the anecdotal 
character of his evidence is the fact that, despite Huber's overblown rhetoric, 
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promote reform “plays a strategic, rhetorical role in the agendas of many 
who attempt to address the pervasive perception of an ongoing legal 
crisis.”112  The use of the “junk science” rhetorical attack was heavily 
subsidized by conservative forces.
113
  This may help explain why the focus 
in the early 1990s of “junk science” avoided criminal defendants and 
criminal cases generally.
114
  
B. The Bendectin Litigation 
In many respects, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
115 
was an 
ideal case for resetting the standards for admitting expert testimony.  The 
defendant, Merrell Dow, manufactured a morning-sickness drug, 
Bendectin, that by the mid-1970s, was taken by 30% of pregnant women 
throughout the country.
116
  This high participation rate gave rise to plenty of 
potential plaintiffs alleging that this morning-sickness drug caused birth 
                                                                                                                 
these stories do not reveal a pattern of systematic judicial acceptance of junk 
science, nor do they uniformly support his thesis that we face a serious threat 
from junk science in the courtroom. 
Id. 
 112. Edmond & Mercer, supra note 82, at 5-6 (“Junk science is a convenient scapegoat 
for deeper law-science conflicts because it plays on public fears of science and technology 
being out of control, while providing a rallying point for legal reform.”). 
 113. See Thomas O. McGarity, Our Science Is Sound Science and Their Science Is Junk 
Science: Science-Based Strategies for Avoiding Accountability and Responsibility for Risk-
Producing Products and Activities, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 897, 905 (2004) (“[T]he Manhattan 
Institute went to great lengths to publicize Huber's catchy ‘junk science’ claim in the popular 
press.”); id. at 905 n.25 (noting that Huber's book “‘reached the public through a massive 
publicity blitz’ financed by the Manhattan Institute” (citing SHELDON RAMPTON & JOHN 
STAUBER, TRUST US, WE'RE EXPERTS! 223-24 (2001))); Edmond & Mercer, supra note 82, at 
4-6 (describing the Manhattan Institute as “a conservative think-tank supported by various 
industry and insurance groups,” and conservative policy-makers). 
 114. Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings from 
Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189, 1194 & n.10 (2004) 
(“It is no secret that Huber's book was aimed at the supposed abuse of science by civil 
plaintiffs.  Huber did not symmetrically apply the same standards to evidence offered by the 
government in criminal cases.”).  Importantly, “[t]his period also marked the beginning of an 
era of the federalization of criminal law, when the federal government began to prosecute 
crimes that had once been solely the responsibility of the states.”  Bernstein, supra note 64, 
at 390; see, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American 
Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1148 (1995) (“The federal government's ‘war on 
drugs’ is the single most significant contributor to this self-perpetuating cycle.  The drug war 
has skewed the federal criminal (and civil) justice system at every possible level.”). 
 115. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 116. Richard Marcus, Reexamining the Bendectin Litigation Story, 83 IOWA L. REV. 231, 
236 (1997). 
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defects in the children they carried.
117
  The first reported trial concerning 
Bendectin was in 1980 and lasted two months.
118
  After multiple deadlocks, 
the jury awarded a small “compromise” verdict of $20,000.119  
Despite the limited success of the first trial, potential plaintiffs claimed 
victory, and the number of those willing to join suit “increased 
dramatically, resulting in the filing of numerous suits and the consolidation 
of [smaller] cases into joint trials.”120  As it prepared to defend an escalating 
number of cases, Merrell Dow removed Bendectin from the market in 
1983.
121
  Contributing to the momentum for plaintiffs, the National 
Enquirer ran a feature story that blamed Bendectin for babies born without 
brains, some without eyeballs, and “several thousand tragically deformed 
infants in the U.S. alone.”122  Quoted in the story was Dr. William McBride, 
who had been widely credited as one of the physicians who first recognized 
in the 1960s that a different drug, Thalidomide, had caused serious birth 
defects.
123
 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Susan Haack, Mind the Analytical Gap! Tracing a Fault Line in Daubert, 61 WAYNE 
L. REV. 653, 659 (2016). 
 118. JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORT LITIGATION 11 
(1998). 
 119. In the first trial, Meckdeci v. Merrell National Laboratories, the jury returned a 
small award to the parents for only the out-of-pocket costs for care of their injured son 
(which had been stipulated to be $20,000).  Id. at 12.  The jury did not award any other 
damages for the son’s injuries.  Id.  
 120. Gary Edmond, Whigs in Court: Historical Problems with Expert Evidence, 14 YALE 
J.L. & HUMAN 123, 160 (2002). 
 121. See W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
547, 584 (2000) (“[T]he wave of Bendectin litigation ultimately cost manufacturers so much 
that they stopped marketing the product.”). 
 122. HUBER, supra note 3, at 111.  The headline read “New Thalidomide Scandal – 
Experts Reveal.”  SANDERS, supra note 118, at 10.  See infra note 123 for background on the 
history of Thalidomide. 
 123. SANDERS, supra note 118, at 5; see also McBride v. Merrell Dow & Pharm., Inc., 
800 F.2d 1208, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“The alleged link between Bendectin and birth 
defects had begotten a widespread and heated public controversy over the drug's safety.  
McBride voluntarily entered this controversy, intending to influence its outcome.  As a 
world-renowned expert on birth defects—he was prominent in discovering the dangers of 
Thalidomide and has been dubbed the ‘Father of Teratology'— McBride occupied a central 
place in the Bendectin debate.” (internal citations omitted)).  Thalidomide was introduced as 
a sedative in Europe in the late 1950s.  Gail H. Javitt & Kathy Hudson, Regulating (for the 
Benefit of) Future Persons: A Different Perspective on the FDA's Jurisdiction to Regulate 
Human Reproductive Cloning, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1201, 1220.  When given to women early 
in pregnancy, however, it caused severe birth defects.  Id.  The FDA, having seen foreign 
studies of the side effects, never approved Thalidomide for use in the United States.  See 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
782 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:759 
 
 
Plaintiffs had other incentives to sue Merrell Dow.  After Bendectin had 
been on the market for two decades, “a few epidemiological studies 
produced in the late 1970s raised, somewhat inconclusively, concerns about 
its safety.”124  Merrell Dow had also been an early manufacturer and 
distributor of Thalidomide in the 1960s, using questionably lax standards in 
sharing the medication with numerous pregnant mothers despite the FDA’s 
lack of approval.
125
  Around that same time, Merrell Dow had conducted 
shoddy research concerning Bendectin, leading plaintiffs to conclude that 
the company might have something to hide.
126
   
Within a few short years, however, suits about the potential harms of 
Bendectin began to seem much less meritorious.  After the initial lawsuits, 
the FDA and other researchers immediately began studying the drug, 
providing a particularly well-developed suite of studies.
127
  Two years after 
                                                                                                                 
Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Accountability and Quality of Care: Lessons from Medical 
Consumerism and the Patients' Rights, Women's Health and Disability Rights Movements, 
20 AM. J. L. & MED. 147, 158 (1994).   
 124. Edmond, supra note 120, at 159; see also Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and 
Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and 
Bendectin Litigation, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 643, 679 (1992) (noting that plaintiffs were 
encouraged by “the publicity generated about the allegations of Bendectin's teratogenicity 
[and] the horror of the Thalidomide experience of the 1960s looming in the background”). 
 125. While awaiting FDA approval, Merrell Dow “engaged in what might charitably be 
called extremely lax behavior” in distributing 2.5 million Thalidomide pills to 20,000 
patients, including 624 pregnant women, injuring at least ten babies with significant birth 
defects.  Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass 
Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 314 (1992).  Interestingly, “[i]n recent years Thalidomide has 
made a comeback of sorts as evidence increases that it may be effective in treating a variety 
of serious diseases such as AIDS, cancer, and leprosy.”  Javitt & Hudson, supra note 123, at 
1221 n.146. 
 126. See Green, supra note 126, at 677 n.155 (“The first epidemiologic study performed 
in 1963 by a Merrell employee and relied on by Merrell for fifteen years was so shoddy in 
method and interpretation that even Merrell has conceded its lack of validity; it has provided 
an inviting target for plaintiffs' attorneys' attacks and claims for punitive damages.”).  In 
addition, Merrell Dow employees were caught reclassifying various animal studies.  Id.  As 
Professor Green concludes, “[G]iven the early scientific record, it was largely fortuitous that 
Bendectin turned out not to [cause birth defects].”  Id. at 678 n.155. 
 127. See Green, supra note 126, at 677 (“[T]he scientific record on Bendectin's 
teratogenicity by the mid-to-late 1980s had become unusually rich.”).  Indeed, “Bendectin 
might safely be generalized to the relatively few agents for which an established and mature 
body of epidemiologic evidence exists.  Tobacco and asbestos are other such agents that 
come to mind, albeit ones where the epidemiologic record demonstrates causation.”  Id. at 
679 n.116; see also id. at 679-80 (“In 1980, after the compromise jury verdict[], the FDA 
convened a review panel of experts to examine the scientific record and render a judgment 
on Bendectin's safety.  The panel essentially exonerated Bendectin.  The panel concluded 
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being removed from the market, there were over thirty studies on the effects 
of Bendectin.
128
  Because birth defects appear so soon after exposure, “the 
development of a significant epidemiologic record [was] much more 
feasible [for Bendectin] than for other toxic substances.”129   
Looking back, the claims against Bendectin seem particularly futile.  
Indeed, judges and scholars routinely cite the Bendectin litigation to 
support the need for reform.
130
  Some have gone so far as to hold out the 
Bendectin litigation as the epitome of plaintiffs using bad science to attack 
perfectly safe products.
131
  Moreover, by the late 1980s it was becoming 
increasingly obvious that Dr. McBride, who by then had served as a 
plaintiffs' expert in multiple cases, had deliberately falsified his research on 
Bendectin.
132
  Ultimately, Merrell Dow was vindicated, as not a single 
                                                                                                                 
that ‘available data do not demonstrate an association between birth defects and Bendectin.’” 
(quoting Press Release, Department of Health and Human Services News, No. P80-45 (Oct. 
7, 1980))). 
 128. Id. at 678 (“By 1985, there were twenty-one epidemiologic studies that focused on 
Bendectin and fourteen other studies that included Bendectin (or one of its components) 
among the agents studied.”). 
 129. Id. at 679.  Bendectin’s toxicity was more investigated than many other suspected 
toxic substances.  Id. at 678.  This is because the sort of injury alleged was apparent at birth, 
which means it was detectable in less than nine months.  Id.  By contrast, many carcinogens 
take decades to show their impact, “which greatly delay (and make more expensive) 
epidemiologic study of carcinogens.” Id.  This made Bendectin unique among the group of 
suspected substances.  The situation concerning Bendectin was also unique given its proven 
record of safety because of the FDA and other investigations.  See id. at 679 (“The additional 
confidence provided the courts by the Food and Drug Administration's regulatory authority 
over Bendectin is yet another reason why the Bendectin decisions are not generalizable.”). 
 130. See Edmond, supra note 120, at 160 (“The cases provide an extensive public record 
of trial and appellate judgments and have generated considerable legal commentary.”). 
 131. See MICHAEL GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS 
TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 328 (1996) (“Bendectin is the Taj Mahal of horror stories 
about the tort system: the single most criticized piece of large-scale litigation of all time.”); 
see also Edmond, supra note 120, at 160 (“[T]he concerns of commentators are focused on 
the inability of juries, and to a lesser degree judges, to properly value the great weight of 
scientific evidence that demonstrated no legally or scientifically meaningful correlation 
between the incidence of birth defects and the consumption of Bendectin.”).  
 132. James M. Sabovich, Petition Without Prejudice: Against the Fraud Exception to 
Noerr-Pennington Immunity from the Toxic Tort Perspective, 17 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 
30-31 (2008) (citing Norman Swan, The Man Who Stopped Thalidomide Accused of Fraud, 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Dec. 14, 1987)).  Indeed, Dr. McBride was discharged from the 
practice of medicine for having falsified Bendectin research the same year as Daubert.  Id. at 
31 n.200 (citing Margaret Scheikowski, Thalidomide Doctor Back After Fraud, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH (Sydney, Austl.) Nov. 10, 1998, at 3). 
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Bendectin verdict withstood appeal,
133
 but not before “the withdrawal of [a 
major drug] from the market” and significant public health ramifications.134  
Without the morning-sickness medication, many pregnant women 
developed serious medical conditions requiring hospitalizations.
135
  
C. Daubert to the Rescue? 
By the time the Supreme Court was ready to hear Daubert,
136
 lower 
“courts ha[d] taken a variety of inconsistent approaches in assessing the 
admissibility of expert testimony on the causal link” between Bendectin and 
plaintiffs' birth defects.
137
  The particular case in Daubert was very much 
like all of the other Bendectin cases.
138
  In Daubert, “two boys [had been] 
born with tragic birth defects that reduced the size of their limbs.”139  Their 
parents sued Merrell Dow, as the manufacturer of “Bendectin, alleging that 
the mothers' use of the drug during pregnancy caused the deformities.”140  
At trial, the defendant’s experts had a stack of epidemiological studies all 
concluding that Bendectin was perfectly safe.
141
  The plaintiffs’ experts had 
mere “reanalyses of the data used in one or two of those epidemiological 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Viscusi, supra note 123, at 584. 
 134. GREEN, supra note 133, at 336.   
 135. The absence of Bendectin led to “an increase in hospitalizations for hyperemesis 
gravidarum, a severe form of morning sickness that requires medical intervention, often by 
intravenous rehydration.”  Id.  Many American women drove to Canada to obtain Bendectin 
and “[i]n desperation, a few doctors say they t[old] women essentially to make their own 
Bendectin.”  Sabovich, supra note 134, at 32 (quoting Gina Kolata, Controversial Drug 
Makes a Comeback, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2000, at F.). 
 136. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd, 951 
F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and aff'd, 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
 137. Lewin, supra note 95, at 184–85; see also id. at 185 n.7 (collecting cases). 
 138. See Haack, supra note 117, at 659 (“Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals was 
in most respects a routine Bendectin case, indistinguishable from the many other cases 
alleging that this morning-sickness drug caused birth defects in the children born to women 
who took it.”). 
 139. Bernstein, supra note 64, at 392; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583. 
 140. Bernstein, supra note 64, at 392; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583. 
 141. See Bernstein, supra note 64, at 392 (“The problem facing the plaintiffs was that the 
defendant presented the trial court with a large body of epidemiological studies showing that 
babies exposed to Bendectin in utero do not have a higher rate of limb reductions than those 
not exposed.”). 
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studies.”142 The trial court held that plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient to 
show causation and granted summary judgment.143  
The Ninth Circuit affirmed,
144
 and remarkably, relied on Frye in 
upholding the lower court’s dismissal.145  The court noted that the plaintiffs' 
experts had not submitted their reanalysis to peer review or published them 
in a scientific journal.
146
  Citing Huber, the court held that because the work 
was not “subjected to verification and scrutiny by others in the field,” it 
would not be accepted in the scientific community.
147
  As many 
commentators have reported, “[t]he Ninth Circuit's Daubert opinion quickly 
gained notoriety for its strong reliance on Frye to exclude evidence in a 
toxic tort case.”148  The Ninth Circuit’s unusual ruling, in combination with 
a range of other rationales other circuits employed in the Bendectin 
                                                                                                                 
 142. Id. 
 143. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 575-76 (S.D. Cal. 1989).  
The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ experts’ use of animal studies.  See id. at 575 
(“[E]xpert testimony concluding that Bendectin causes limb reduction defects which is 
generally based upon in vitro studies, chemical structure analyses and animal studies is 
insufficient to take the issue to the jury.”).   
 144. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 145. See id. at 1129–30; see also Bernstein, supra note 65, at 392 (“[T]he court simply 
ignored the fact that [Frye’s] general acceptance test had never previously been applied in a 
civil case in the Ninth Circuit, and had only been applied twice before in the toxic tort 
context in other jurisdictions.”); Haack, supra note 117, at 660 & n.50 (“[I]n affirming this 
exclusion, the court of appeals had specifically cited Frye—which, however, had up till then 
been used in criminal trials rather than in [two] civil cases.” (citing Barrel of Fun v. State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 739 F.2d at 1028 (5th Cir.1984); Christopherson v. Allied Signal 
Corp., 902 F.2d 362 (5th Cir.1990), superseded by 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1990))). 
 146. Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1130.  
 147. Id. at 1131.  As the Ninth Circuit reasoned on remand: 
Bendectin litigation has been pending in the courts for over a decade, yet the 
only review the plaintiffs' experts' work has received has been by judges and 
juries, and the only place their theories and studies have been published is in 
the pages of federal and state reporters.  None of the plaintiffs' experts has 
published his work on Bendectin in a scientific journal or solicited formal 
review by his colleagues.  Despite the many years the controversy has been 
brewing, no one in the scientific community—except defendant's experts—has 
deemed these studies worthy of verification, refutation or even comment.  It's 
as if there were a tacit understanding within the scientific community that 
what's going on here is not science at all, but litigation. 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 148. Bernstein, supra note 64, at 393. 
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litigation, offered the Supreme Court the perfect case to square the standard 
once and for all.
149
 
While the Court certainly addressed the basic issue before it—namely, 
the continued viability of Frye in the federal courts
150—the Court went 
further to establish a new standard for the admissibility of expert 
evidence.
151
  In explaining this evidentiary standard, the Daubert Court 
pointed to several factors that a trial judge might consider: (1) “whether a 
theory or technique . . . can be (and has been) tested”; (2) “whether the 
theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication”; (3) 
“[i]n the case of a particular scientific technique . . . the known or potential 
rate of error”; and (4) a scientific technique’s “degree of acceptance within 
[a relevant scientific] community.”152  The Court emphasized that the 
review is “a flexible one.”153  The Court expressed confidence in the 
adversarial system, explaining that “[v]igorous cross-examination, 
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of 
proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but 
admissible evidence.”154  As a procedural matter, the Court advised that 
judges should perform a “preliminary assessment of whether that reasoning 
or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid” in advance 
of trial.
155
  
Many have criticized the Daubert decision as unclear and contradictory, 
leaving future courts confused as to whether they should interpret Daubert 
as establishing a strict or lenient standard of admissibility.
156
  As Professor 
David Bernstein and co-author Eric Lasker explain, the Court clearly 
                                                                                                                 
 149. As the Court explained, “We granted certiorari in light of sharp divisions among the 
courts regarding the proper standard for the admission of expert testimony.”  Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993) (citation omitted).  
 150. Id. at 589 (holding that “the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence”). 
 151. See Flores et al., supra note 72, at 535 (detailing how “the ‘Daubert trilogy’ would 
fundamentally alter the dynamic of expert evidence admissibility”). 
 152. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94.  The Court further explained that “[m]any factors will 
bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test.”  Id. at 
593. 
 153. Id. at 594. 
 154. Id. at 596 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)). 
 155. Id. at 592-93; see also Flores et al., supra note 72, at 536 (“Daubert effectively 
placed judges in a ‘gatekeeper’ position, necessitating a more active role than under Frye 
and charging them with the responsibility for evaluating the scientific validity of the basis 
for expert testimony.”).  
 156.  See, e.g., Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 89, at 5 (“The Court larded Daubert with 
conflicting rhetoric that left ambiguous whether the case should be interpreted as 
establishing a strict or lenient standard of admissibility.”). 
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suggested a lenient standard when it “noted ‘the “liberal thrust” of the 
Federal Rules [of Evidence] and their “general approach of relaxing the 
traditional barriers to ‘opinion’ testimony,’”157 and “emphasized the 
‘flexible’ nature of the inquiry in which trial courts must engage.”158  As 
they point out, “[t]he Court [even] expressed optimism about the 
capabilities of the adversarial process and of the jury, and [it] spoke of 
‘shaky but admissible evidence.’”159  But the Court in Daubert also 
suggests applying a strict standard.  As Bernstein and Lasker explain, “the 
Court insisted that trial court judges adopt ‘a gatekeeping role’ to ‘ensure 
that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only 
relevant, but reliable;’”160 “[t]he Court emphasized that Rule 702 ‘requires a 
valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to 
admissibility;’”161 “[a]nd the Court explained that under the Federal Rules, 
a trial judge ‘exercises more control over experts than over lay 
witnesses.’”162  
The two most immediate changes to the courts from the Daubert 
decision started with “the new role it thrust upon the district judge.”163  
First, the examination of expert testimony shifted from after the verdict to 
pretrial motions in limine.
164
  Interestingly, studies showed that the increase 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588). 
 158. Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594).  
 159. Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596); see also David E. Bernstein, The 
Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert Revolution, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27, 43 
(2013) [hereinafter Bernstein, Misbegotten] (“The Court's more forgiving remarks seemed 
aimed primarily at a mythical version of Frye, understood as an ‘austere’ rule that made it 
extremely difficult to present expert testimony.”).  The Court’s view of the application of 
Frye “is not, in fact, how Frye had traditionally been applied.”  Bernstein & Lasker, supra 
note 90, at 5 n.14. Courts were far more permissive in their application of Frye than what the 
Court suggested. See Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 90, at 6. 
 160. Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 90, at 5 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587, 597); see 
also Lander, supra note 19, at 1662 (“The U.S. Supreme Court held that Rule 702 requires 
courts to serve as ‘gatekeepers’ who must assess the underlying ‘reliability’ of proffered 
expert testimony.”). “[T]here was nothing particularly novel about a trial judge having the 
power to exclude inappropriate expert testimony,” given Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a).  
Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of the 
Supreme Court's Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 289, 293 (2001) (citing FED. R. EVID. 104(a)).  But “Daubert stressed the trial court's 
obligation to exercise this power.”  Id. 
 161. Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 90, at 5 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592). 
 162. Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595).  
 163. See Berger, supra note 160, at 293. 
 164. As Professor Berger points out, 
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in motions was largely driven by civil defendants challenging plaintiffs’ 
experts.
165
    
Second, “judges were put on notice that—like it or not—they were going 
to have to deal with science.”166  Judges could no longer simply rely on the 
credentials of an expert witness.
167
  Daubert now required judges to assess 
the validity of the expert’s testimony and “whether their testimony was 
based on ‘scientific knowledge.’”168  
III. Daubert’s Impact on the Law and the Courts 
A. The Daubert Trilogy 
The Court continued to refine the Daubert standard in two subsequent 
decisions, which together with Daubert comprise the “Daubert Trilogy.”  
General Electric Co. v. Joiner,
169
 the second case in the trilogy, put greater 
control in the hands of the trial court.  The Court in Joiner addressed “the 
standard of appellate review for evidentiary rulings” under Daubert.170  The 
district court had excluded Joiner's experts and granted summary 
                                                                                                                 
Although some expert proof was excluded before trial on admissibility grounds 
prior to Daubert, the Bendectin litigation demonstrates that this was not the 
customary procedure in the federal courts. Plaintiffs were uniformly 
unsuccessful in these cases in federal court, not because judges refused to admit 
their proffered expert proof, but because trial and appellate courts found it 
insufficient even when plaintiffs received a jury verdict at trial. 
Id. at 293 n.29 (citing Sanders, supra note 125, at 374-79).  “Defendants were quick to see 
the implications.”  Id. at 293.  Judges’ new responsibility to filter out bad science before trial 
“encouraged defendants to seek pretrial rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony and 
to follow a favorable result with a motion for summary judgment if the experts excluded 
were essential to the plaintiff's prima facie case.”  Id.  
 165. See Flores et al., supra note 72, at 539; see also id. at 561-64 (discussing the results 
of their study and summarizing data from other studies). 
 166. Berger, supra note 160, at 293. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id.; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 
1995) (applying, on remand, the standard created by the Supreme Court with the statement, 
“Mindful of our position in the hierarchy of the federal judiciary, we take a deep breath and 
proceed with this heady task”). 
 169. 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (considering plaintiff’s claim that his lung cancer is from 
exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”)). 
 170. Id. at 140; see id. at 138-39 (“We granted certiorari in this case to determine what 
standard an appellate court should apply in reviewing a trial court's decision to admit or 
exclude expert testimony under Daubert.  We hold that abuse of discretion is the appropriate 
standard.” (citations omitted)). 
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judgement, dismissing his case.
171
  The court of appeals reversed, arguing 
that because there is a preference for admissibility, appellate courts should 
apply a “particularly stringent standard of review.”172  
The Court disagreed and held that Daubert had not changed the standard 
of review of evidentiary exclusions, which remained the same as in other 
evidentiary rulings: abuse of discretion.
173
  Because the exclusion of 
plaintiff's expert proof on causation led to a grant of summary judgment, 
the standard presumably applies even when the ruling was “outcome 
determinative.”174  The Court went on to clarify that the trial court had not 
abused its discretion in excluding Joiner's experts.
175
   
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
176
 the final case in the trilogy, expanded 
the reach of Daubert to non-scientist expert witnesses.
177
  Specifically, the 
                                                                                                                 
 171. The trial court found persuasive the absence of studies demonstrating the promotion 
of cancer in any species other than mice.  Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1324 
(N.D. Ga. 1994), rev'd, 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 172. Joiner, 78 F.3d at 529.  
 173. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 142. 
 174. Id. at 141-43.  By imposing an abuse of discretion standard, however, the Court 
“effectively insulates the trial judge's decision from serious appellate review.”  Gottesman, 
supra note 70, at 760 n.33.  This is potentially worrisome because “only one trial judge sits 
on a case, in contrast to multiple jurors, and thus a greater risk exists that an aberrant notion 
will go uncorrected and determine the outcome.”  Id.  
 175. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146-47.  The Court provided a detailed review of why the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding plaintiff’s expert: 
The studies involved infant mice that had developed cancer after being exposed 
to PCB's.  The infant mice in the studies had had massive doses of PCB's 
injected directly into their peritoneums or stomachs.  Joiner was an adult 
human being whose alleged exposure to PCB's was far less than the exposure in 
the animal studies.  The PCB's were injected into the mice in a highly 
concentrated form. The fluid with which Joiner had come into contact generally 
had a much smaller PCB concentration of between 0-to-500 parts per million.  
The cancer that these mice developed was alveologenic adenomas; Joiner had 
developed small-cell carcinomas.  No study demonstrated that adult mice 
developed cancer after being exposed to PCB's.  One of the experts admitted 
that no study had demonstrated that PCB's lead to cancer in any other species. 
Id. at 144.  Because the Court employed such a detailed review of the evidence in question, 
its opinion “provides insights into applying the Daubert test in a toxic tort context.”  Berger, 
supra note 158, at 294.   
 176. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 177. Id. at 138 (“The Daubert ‘gatekeeping’ obligation applies not only to ‘scientific’ 
testimony, but to all expert testimony.”); see id. at 147 (“The initial question before us is 
whether this basic gatekeeping obligation applies only to ‘scientific’ testimony or to all 
expert testimony.  We . . . believe that it applies to all expert testimony.”); see id. at 151 
(“We do not believe that Rule 702 creates a schematism that segregates expertise by type 
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Court held that the Daubert test applied to plaintiff’s engineering expert.178  
Importantly, the Court held that the exclusion of plaintiff’s expert was 
proper, using a “flexible” application of Daubert.179  The Court emphasized 
repeatedly that the Daubert test was to be viewed as “flexible” and not a 
rigid checklist of factors to apply in every case.
180
  Without explaining 
exactly how a trial court would determine whether a particular Daubert 
factor is pertinent, the Court stressed that a trial court has “considerable 
leeway” in developing its procedure for determining whether a particular 
expert's testimony is reliable.  As the Court left it, a judge “should consider 
the specific factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable 
measures of the reliability of expert testimony.”181 
B. Daubert:  The Results 
After twenty-five years, there is still considerable dispute over whether 
Daubert has resulted in greater exclusion of expert testimony.
182
  The first 
                                                                                                                 
while mapping certain kinds of questions to certain kinds of experts.  Life and the legal cases 
that it generates are too complex to warrant so definitive a match.”). 
 178. See Berger, supra note 158, at 295 n.43 (“The court below, as well as some other 
circuits, had held that a less stringent test applies in the case of non-scientific expert 
testimony.”).  Indeed, that was the appellate court’s decision here.  See Carmichael v. 
Samyang Tire, 131 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1998), rev'd, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 
U.S. 137 (1999) (holding that non-scientific testimony was not held to the Daubert test).  
The case originated from a rear tire blowout on a minivan occupied by eight members of the 
Carmichael family.  Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 142.  One member of the Carmichael family 
died in the resulting accident, and the others were severely injured.  Id.  The engineering 
expert intended to testify that the blowout was due to a manufacturing or design defect.  Id. 
 179. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 139 (“[T]here is no indication in the record that other 
experts in the industry use Carlson's particular approach or that tire experts normally make 
the very fine distinctions necessary to support his conclusions, nor are there references to 
articles or papers that validate his approach.”). 
 180. According to the Court, the Daubert factors do not constitute a “definitive checklist 
or test.”  Id. at 150.  The Court clarified: 
[W]e can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and for all time the 
applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert, nor can we now do so for 
subsets of cases categorized by category of expert or by kind of evidence. Too 
much depends upon the particular circumstances of the particular case at issue. 
Id.  This flexibility was dependent on the facts of each individual case.  Id.  
 181. Id. at 152 (“[W]e conclude that the trial judge must have considerable leeway in 
deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert 
testimony is reliable.”). 
 182. See Brandon L. Garrett & M. Chris Fabricant, The Myth of the Reliability Test, 86 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1559, 1568 (2018) (“Some scholars, focusing on both civil and criminal 
cases, have observed that Daubert did not change the practice in federal or state courts, 
while others have found a qualitative difference and a measurably stricter analysis in civil 
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sign that this might be a complicated question is that both sides of the 
debate—plaintiff’s and defense counsel—claimed victory after the 
decision.
183
  Many researchers have concluded that Daubert resulted in a 
significant increase in the exclusion of expert testimony, particularly in the 
area of toxic torts, and the case has drawn criticism that the standard set the 
bar too high.
184
  Other interpretations of the data suggest that the exclusion 
of expert testimony did not increase significantly after Daubert.
185
  The 
                                                                                                                 
cases in state and federal courts.”).  Indeed, five years ago Professors Jurs & Devito noted 
that “[t]he question of whether Daubert . . . adopted a more lenient or more stringent 
standard for testing the reliability of expert evidence has dogged academics, practitioners, 
and researchers for twenty years.”  Jurs & Devito, supra note 48, at 677; see also Erica 
Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific Evidence, 
71 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 74-76 (1998) (observing that already in the early days after Daubert, 
the issue of whether Daubert imposes a stricter standard for the admissibility of scientific 
evidence is a recurring topic of debate).  Of course, conducting valid studies with precise 
measures of the impact of Daubert runs into many logistical barriers, including selection 
bias given how few cases proceed to trial and the difficulty in identifying information in 
cases that utilize expert evidence, but in which no challenge or Daubert issue is raised, 
among other problems in researching the issue.  Flores et al., supra note 72, at 541. 
 183. Faigman et al., supra note 26, at 1819. 
 184. See, e.g., Jurs & Devito, supra note 48, at 677 n.4 (“Our analysis of district court 
opinions suggests that after Daubert, judges scrutinized reliability more carefully and 
applied stricter standards in deciding whether to admit expert evidence.” (quoting LLOYD 
DIXON & BRIAN GILL, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CHANGES IN THE STANDARD FOR 
ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT DECISION xv 
(2001))); Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns 
Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 309, 330 
(2002) (“The number of trials in which all of the proffered expert testimony was allowed has 
been reduced relative to the pre-Daubert era.  The difference in rates is modest but robust.”); 
Joseph Sanders, Applying Daubert Inconsistently? Proof of Individual Causation in Toxic 
Tort and Forensic Cases, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1367, 1374 (2010) (“In no area has the 
Daubert revolution had a greater effect than in toxic torts. The number of cases in which 
expert causation testimony has been excluded must by now run into the thousands.  Many 
commentators have reacted negatively to this trend, arguing that the bar has been set too 
high.”). 
 185. See Billauer, Daubert Debunked, supra note 64, at 22 (“While more evidence was 
evaluated for admissibility after Daubert, by 1997 roughly the same percentage of evidence 
was deemed admissible.”); Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert 
Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 498 (2005) 
(finding that the influence of Daubert on removal rates was “vanishingly small” in 
magnitude and “statistically insignificant”); Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of 
Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 339, 345-46 (2002) (study of 693 state and federal criminal 
appeals cases between 1987 and 1998 found no statistically significant change in overall 
admissibility rates). 
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reality is that “[r]esearch since 1993, using a variety of methodologies, has 
been largely inconsistent.”186   
The picture gets a little clearer when looking at the years immediately 
before and after Daubert.  According to a recent analysis, in the three years 
prior to Daubert, there was a relatively sharp increase in the admissibility 
of scientific evidence, particularly in toxic tort cases.
187
  This was followed 
by a significant decrease in the three years following the decision, as the 
rate of exclusion increased after the Court’s decision in Daubert.188  As the 
author of the analysis concluded, “This suggests that the decision in 
Daubert was a response to concerns about the increase in ‘junk science’ 
being used as evidence in court proceedings, and that the decrease 
following Daubert was simply righting the ship.”189   
Whatever impact Daubert had on the actual exclusion rates by courts, 
one influence is fairly well-documented: the impact on perceptions and 
                                                                                                                 
 186. Jurs & DeVito, supra note 48, at 677; see also id. at 731 (“Some survey data 
indicated that judges saw Daubert as a stricter standard, while some did not.  Some case 
review analysis found that Daubert was a stricter standard, while some did not.”).  But see 
id. at 679-81 (finding evidence, based on changes in removal rates in four million cases from 
state to federal court depending on state court adoption of Daubert standards, that “civil 
defendants believe the Daubert standard is more restrictive to expert testimony and act 
accordingly”). 
 187. Billauer, Daubert Debunked, supra note 64, at 18.  
 188. Id. Interestingly, “[w]hile more evidence was evaluated for admissibility after 
Daubert, by 1997 “roughly the same percentage of evidence was deemed admissible.”  Id. at 
22;  see id. at 23 (“In effect, then, Daubert merely effectuated a short-term course correction 
to address an anomalous situation—before matters returned to the old status quo.”); id. at 23 
n.103 (“noting sharp rise in excluded evidence immediately after Daubert and returning to 
base-line equilibrium after 1997, assuming the years 1980-89 reflect baseline”); see also 
Krafka et al., supra note 184, at 322 (reporting that federal judges surveyed prior to Daubert 
reported excluding or limiting challenged expert evidence in 25% of the cases and excluding 
or limiting challenged expert evidence in 41% in a survey conducted approximately a half 
decade following the decision). 
 189. Billauer, Daubert Debunked, supra note 64, at 23; Alexandra Kennedy-Breit, 
Admissibility of Expert Evidence to Prove Causation in Toxic Torts, 53 TORT TRIAL & INS. 
PRAC. L.J. 139, 146 (2017).  Another interesting recent discovery is that the percentage of 
experts that are plaintiff’s experts has dropped significantly since Daubert.  Flores et al., 
supra note 72, at 549.  Of course, other changes besides Daubert have no doubt had an 
impact on expert testimony admissibility.  Id. at 564 (noting that in a survey of judges, one 
common response was that “Daubert . . . was one change (albeit a major one) among many 
used by the federal court system to deal with heavy caseloads and the growing use of expert 
evidence.”); id. (“Thus, concluding that Daubert led to all the changes delineated in our 
report could arguably be a spurious claim.”). 
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norms.
190
  Indeed, some have argued “that Daubert’s most important 
contribution . . . has more to do with Daubert's educative function than with 
its doctrinal text.”191  Daubert created a “cultural shift” that altered the 
behavior of both judges and lawyers.
192
  As one study noted, “attorneys 
reported more closely scrutinizing the credentials of their own experts and 
filing more motions to exclude opposing expert evidence.”193  The shift 
from post-trial to pre-trial evaluation of expert witness testimony by courts 
resulted in greater use of motions in limine.
194
  Lawyers also reported being 
more active “in the preparation of their experts’ testimony.”195  Daubert’s 
                                                                                                                 
 190. See Jurs & DeVito, supra note 48, at 731 (“[B]ased on actual behavior in millions of 
real cases, civil defendants believe the Daubert standard to be a stricter one.  Not only does 
the removal rate increase in the years after Daubert, as one would expect if the standard for 
admissibility is tighter, but we can also show that if the state adopts Daubert, and in so doing 
returns the state and federal court to the same admissibility standard, the removal rate then 
drops in response.  Both of these effects support the conclusion that defendants perceive 
Daubert as an advantageous, stricter standard.”). 
 191. A. Leah Vickers, Daubert, Critique and Interpretation: What Empirical Studies Tell 
Us About the Application of Daubert, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 109, 147 (2005); see also id. at 110 
(“Daubert has had a profound effect on the admissibility of evidence but not via the means 
that most critics would guess.  In fact, Daubert's impacts appear to be the result not of the 
doctrinal test set forth in the decision, but rather of a cultural phenomenon either sparked by 
the decision, or to which the decision has contributed.”). 
 192. Id. at 147 (observing that the impact of Daubert appears to be a cultural shift toward 
a better appreciation of scientific evidence); see also Billauer, Daubert Debunked, supra note 
64, at 22-23 (“I (and others) argue that the spike in evidentiary rejection in the years 
preceding 1997 occurred because Daubert sounded a clarion cry that evidence was being too 
hastily and inappropriately admitted in the period immediately prior—rather than any 
implementation of the Daubert tests.”); id. at 23 n.106 (“[A]fter a short period of judicial 
crackdown (1993-1997) plaintiffs' attorneys stopped introducing patently improper 
evidence—a practice that in the years leading up to Daubert, was judicially sanctioned, 
causing more bad science to be proffered, and more to be admitted.”). 
 193. Krafka et al., supra note 184, at 330.  The study hypothesized that the change was 
“[p]erhaps in response to the increasingly active role of the judges in excluding or limiting 
testimony.”  Id.; see also Flores et al., supra note 72, at 563 (“Daubert has had a 
considerable impact with regard to challenges to proffered expert evidence.  In limine 
challenges have grown in frequency, and the bases of these challenges are now based 
heavily on substantive grounds, including the Daubert standards.”). 
 194. Krafka et al., supra note 184, at 330 (“Motions in limine are in much greater use 
than they were prior to Daubert, so it is not surprising to find that judges are holding more 
pretrial Daubert-like hearings than previously.”). 
 195. Id.  The changes in behavior have affected both lawyers and judges.  See id. (“The 
results of these surveys suggest that recent Supreme Court decisions have influenced the 
practices of federal judges and attorneys with respect to expert testimony in civil cases.   
Clarification of admissibility standards appears to have encouraged both groups to take a 
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major impact was not through imposing a more rigid legal test, “but rather 
in its ability to create greater awareness of the problems of junk science.” 196 
C. Problems with Judges and the Application of the Daubert Standard 
In the wake of Daubert, courts applied inconsistent criteria to the 
admissibility of expert witness testimony.  Lower courts relied on “cherry-
picked, permissive-sounding language from Daubert” to justify their 
rulings, which sparked efforts to amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to 
better reflect and clarify the rule on expert admissibility.
197
  Rule 702 was 
amended in 2000 “for the express purpose of resolving conflicts in the 
courts about the meaning of Daubert.”198  The new rule, however, did not 
fix the problem.
199
  As a recent analysis found, “federal courts often ignore 
the language of amended Rule 702 when determining whether to uphold a 
district court decision excluding expert testimony.  Other courts pay lip 
service to the Rule by quoting its language but then proceed to ignore its 
text for the remainder of the opinion.”200  The researchers conclude that “it 
is now apparent that the 2000 amendments to Rule 702 have not succeeded 
in entrenching these requirements.”201  
                                                                                                                 
more active role in scrutinizing proffered testimony.  Judges have become more discerning 
with respect to the evidence they permit experts to introduce at trial.”). 
 196. Cheng & Yoon, supra note 185, at 503; see Vickers, supra note 191, at 140 (“To the 
extent the decision had a real effect on admissibility, it did so primarily by informing judges 
that they should function as gatekeepers to ensure that bad science does not make its way 
into the courtroom.”).   
 197. Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 90, at 6.  
 198. Id. at 6; see also id. at 7 n.31 (“This Rule, along with other Federal Rules of 
Evidence, was restyled in 2011 ’to make [it] more easily understood and to make style and 
terminology consistent throughout the rules.’” (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory 
committee's note to 2011 amendment)). 
 199. Id. at 43 (“Notwithstanding the rulemaking efforts of the Judicial Conference, the 
courts remain as divided over Daubert's meaning today as they were in the 1990s.”). 
 200. Id. at 19 (citing cases as examples). 
 201. Id. at 8 (“Although the language of the 2000 amendments appeared sufficient at the 
time to rein in recalcitrant judges who had tried to evade the Daubert trilogy's exacting 
admissibility standards, with the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear that the Judicial 
Conference failed to account for the tenacity of those who prefer the pre-Daubert approach 
to expert testimony.”); see also Krafka et al., supra note 184, at 330 (“The bases for limiting 
or excluding testimony do not appear to have been greatly affected by Daubert, at least not 
with respect to the cases we sampled.  Judges who excluded testimony in the recent survey 
did so most often because it was not relevant, the witness was not qualified, or the testimony 
would not have assisted the trier of fact.  These reasons are similar to reasons most 
frequently cited by judges in 1991, and they do not reflect the factors cited in Daubert.”). 
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Part of the reason for judges’ lack of consistency in applying Daubert 
could be a widespread lack of scientific competency.
202
  As Professor Jules 
Epstein explains, “[s]tudies have shown an appalling lack of understanding 
of Daubert . . . terms,”203 and “[j]udges, when surveyed, have 
acknowledged ‘that their [scientific] education had left them inadequately 
prepared to serve as gatekeepers under Daubert.’”204  In a survey of 400 
state court judges, for example, 96% “reported that they had not received 
instruction about general scientific methods and principles.”205  Confirming 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s worries in his Daubert dissent that the Court's 
decision might result in turning judges into “amateur scientists,”206 one 
study found that a relatively small percentage of judges have any job 
                                                                                                                 
 202. See Andrew Jurs, Judicial Analysis of Complex & Cutting-Edge Science in the 
Daubert Era: Epidemiologic Risk Assessment as a Test Case for Reform Strategies, 42 
CONN. L. REV. 49, 52, 71 (2009) (“[E]mpirical research demonstrates that the judiciary is 
poorly prepared to handle the difficult scientific issues presented in courtrooms.”); see also 
Valerie P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific Evidence, 16 J.L. & POL'Y 19, 30 (2007) 
(“Some scholars have speculated that many judges have little attraction to or aptitude for 
math and science.”).  Of course, lawyers are not much better.  See Jules Epstein, The 
National Commission on Forensic Science: Impactful or Ineffectual, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 
743, 756 n.73 (2018) (“[L]awyers as a group evidence an appalling degree of scientific 
illiteracy, which ill equips them to educate and guide the bench in its decisions on 
admissibility of evidence proffered through expert witnesses.”). 
 203. Epstein, supra note 202, at 757.  See generally Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the 
Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging Scientific Evidence in a Post-Daubert 
World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 444-45 (2001) (asking 400 state court judges to define 
error rate and falsifiability and finding that only 4% and 6%, respectively, could give a 
sound definition of these two key guidelines from Daubert). 
 204. Epstein, supra note 202, at 757 (quoting Edward J. Imwinkelried, Expert Testimony 
Trends in State Practice and the Uniform Rules of Evidence, in OPINION AND EXPERT 
TESTIMONY IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 417 (ALI-CLE Course of Study 2008)). 
 205. Gatowski et al., supra note 203, at 442. 
 206. See Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 600-01 (1993) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I do not doubt that Rule 702 confides to the 
judge some gatekeeping responsibility. . . .  But I do not think it imposes on them either the 
obligation or the authority to become amateur scientists.”).  On remand, the Ninth Circuit 
echoed similar concerns.  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (“As we read the Supreme Court's teaching in Daubert, therefore, though we are 
largely untrained in science and certainly no match for any of the witnesses whose testimony 
we are reviewing, it is our responsibility to determine whether those experts' proposed 
testimony amounts to ‘scientific knowledge,’ constitutes ‘good science,’ and was ‘derived 
by the scientific method.’”).  Justice Breyer made a similar observation in Joiner.  See 
General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 148 (1997) (Breyer, J. concurring) (“[J]udges are 
not scientists and do not have the scientific training that can facilitate the making of such 
decisions.”). 
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experience with math or science.
207
  Given the complexity of cases 
involving science, judges may also have an irresistible incentive to bypass 
the time-consuming analysis required in cases with hard science expert 
testimony.
208
 
IV. Daubert’s Unfinished Work:  Criminal Cases 
and Junk Forensic Science 
While the data on the exact impact of Daubert may still be unsettled, one 
distressing conclusion is clear: there are profound disparities in how 
Daubert has been applied, both between civil and criminal contexts, and 
between parties in each context.  Multiple studies examining the disparities 
reach the same result.
209
  Daubert has had little or no influence on the 
admissibility of science—good or bad—in criminal cases.210  Initial studies 
“showed that the bulk of federal cases citing to Daubert were in civil, not 
                                                                                                                 
 207. Hans, supra note 202, at 30 (stating that, of the sixty-five judges surveyed, only 
“five [7.7%] reported having some job experience [with] math or science”). 
 208. See Billauer, Daubert Debunked, supra note 64, at 4 (“It is no surprise, then, some 
studies indicate that gatekeepers have simply substituted their own methods for evaluating 
evidence, rather than relying on standards set forth in Daubert, which to them are 
incomprehensible.”); Gottesman, supra note 70, at 760 n.33 (“[T]rial judges have an 
incentive, however much they try to prevent its subconscious effect on their decisions, to 
clear their crowded dockets of cases that are likely to be time-consuming and, given the 
technicality of the evidence, tedious.  A virtually unreviewable opportunity to shed cases 
that the judge thinks of doubtful merit must be a powerful temptation.”). 
 209. See infra notes 212-51 and accompanying text (collecting studies). 
 210. See Flores et al., supra note 72, at 538 n.37 (“This lack of significant difference with 
respect to changes in admissibility rates in the realm of criminal cases represents something 
of a departure from what was found in research utilizing civil case samples.”); Groscup et 
al., supra note 185, at 364 (reviewing criminal appellate decisions and observing “the 
Daubert decision did not impact on the admission rates of expert testimony at either the trial 
or the appellate court levels”); Neufeld, supra note 12, at S107 (calling Daubert “almost 
irrelevant” to criminal justice).  Perhaps this should not be a surprise, since Daubert itself 
did not mention criminal cases or forensic science.  See Murphy, supra note 1, at 621 (“For 
instance, the opinion itself, which talked breathlessly about the scientific ideal of 
‘reliability’ . . . conspicuously omitted any reference to the forensic sciences that routinely 
arose in criminal courts.”).  And the Ninth Circuit decision, on remand, went so far as to 
suggest that forensic science was not part of the Daubert mandate.  Daubert, 43 F.3d at 
1315, 1317 n.5.  As Professor Murphy puts it, the court was “palpably bristling at the 
‘daunting’ task of acting as an arbiter of scientific reliability, [and] took pains to exempt 
‘[f]ingerprint analysis, voice recognition, DNA fingerprinting and a variety of other 
scientific endeavors closely tied to law enforcement’ from Daubert's strictures, setting up a 
de facto divide between civil and criminal Daubert.”  Murphy, supra note 1, at 622 (quoting 
Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317 n.5).  
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criminal, cases.”211  Moreover, civil plaintiffs are more likely to lose on 
expert witness admissibility challenges than civil defendants, while 
criminal prosecutors are likely to win expert witness admissibility 
challenges far more frequently than criminal defendants, and more often 
than civil parties on either side.
212
  As Professor Susan Rozelle summed up, 
“The game of scientific evidence looks fixed.”213  From all reaches of the 
legal community, “commentators, scholars, and courts themselves seem to 
acknowledge that there exists a Daubert double standard.”214 
A. Disparities in the Courts Part I:  Between Criminal and Civil 
While the application of Daubert arguably put a limit on the use of 
questionable science in civil cases, the opposite is true on the criminal side.  
A recent study “observed an entrenched judicial unwillingness to review 
expert evidence at all in criminal cases, much less to assess reliability and 
restrict expert testimony that is unreliable.”215  The impact on criminal 
defendants has been extreme, even leading to wrongful convictions, which 
“predictably result from this lax attitude toward judicial gatekeeping.”216  
Hundreds of people have been exonerated in the past two decades; roughly 
half of these cases involved faulty forensic science that was not excluded by 
                                                                                                                 
 211. Garrett & Fabricant, supra note 182, at 1567-68.  The data shows a “marked tilt 
toward civil litigation in the use of that expert gatekeeping standard.”  Id. at 1567. 
 212. Deirdre Dwyer, (Why) Are Civil and Criminal Expert Evidence Different?, 43 
TULSA L. REV. 381, 383 (2007) (“[Although] [t]here are significant methodological 
difficulties with inferring general trial conduct from reported decisions, and particularly 
where those decisions are appellate[,] [t]he published reports do broadly support the 
anecdotal evidence of the unequal application of Daubert.”).  As Professor Murphy put it, 
“Civil defendants win their Daubert reliability challenges to plaintiffs' proffers most of the 
time, and . . . criminal defendants virtually always lose their reliability challenges to 
government proffers.”  Murphy, supra note 1, at 622-23 (quoting D. Michael Risinger, 
Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 
64 ALB. L. REV.  99, 99 (2000)); see also Vickers, supra note 191, at 136 (“[C]ivil 
defendants prevail in their challenges to expert testimony most of the time, while criminal 
defendants ‘virtually always lose their reliability challenges.’” (quoting Risinger, supra, at 
99)). 
 213. Susan Rozelle, Daubert, Schmaubert: Criminal Defendants and the Short End of the 
Science Stick, 43 TULSA L. REV. 597, 598 (2007). 
 214. Murphy, supra note 1, at 624. 
 215. Garrett & Fabricant, supra note 182, at 1581; see also Margaret A. Berger, What 
Has a Decade of Daubert Wrought?, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S59, S64 (2005) (citing studies 
that show that “judges are much more likely since Daubert to scrutinize expert testimony 
before trial and then to limit or exclude expert testimony” in civil cases, although “courts are 
not applying Daubert stringently in the criminal context”). 
 216. Garrett & Fabricant, supra note 182, at 1581. 
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the courts.
217
  Unfortunately for these exonerees, and the many wrongfully 
convicted who will never have the chance to clear their names,
218
 “the 
heightened standards of dependability imposed on expertise proffered in 
civil cases has continued to expand, but . . . expertise proffered by the 
prosecution in criminal cases has been largely insulated from any change in 
pre-Daubert standards or approach.”219 
Indeed, a recent report commissioned by the federal government 
confirmed the different standards in civil and criminal cases, remarking that 
“courts have not . . . imposed standards ensuring the application of 
scientifically valid reasoning and reliable methodology in criminal cases 
involving Daubert questions.”220  Furthermore, the report concludes that 
upon reviewing the reported decisions, “at least in criminal cases, forensic 
science evidence is not routinely scrutinized pursuant to the standard of 
reliability enunciated in Daubert.”221  In civil cases, on the other hand, 
“courts seem quite up to the task of evaluating microbiology, teratology, 
and toxicology evidence, discussing both science and statistics with plenty 
of acumen.”222  The general conclusion is that “judges do not appear to be 
as vigilant in criminal cases as they are in civil cases.”223   
                                                                                                                 
 217. Lander, supra note 19, at 1662 (reporting that some of the exonerees were “inmates 
on death row or who had spent decades in prison” and that some of the defective science that 
courts admitted to convict them was “egregiously” faulty).   
 218. Sadly, the “true number of wrongful convictions must be considerably larger since 
evidence that could prove innocence is only rarely available and preserved.”  Id. 
 219. Risinger, supra note 212, at 149; see also Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court's 
“Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1071, 1073 n.12 (2003) (“This issue is 
not new.  The first Bush Administration, by executive order, imposed high standards for the 
admissibility of expert testimony in civil cases, while federal prosecutors were permitted to 
argue for lower standards in DNA cases.”); see also Murphy, supra note 1, at 621 (“The 
conventional wisdom holds, and empirical studies support, that evidence proffered by 
plaintiffs in civil cases receives harsh scrutiny for reliability, whereas evidence proffered by 
prosecutors in criminal cases typically gets a free pass.”). 
 220. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC 
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 96 (2009) [hereinafter NAS REPORT]. 
 221. Id. at 106. 
 222. Moriarty, supra note 18, at 315; see also Saks, supra note 31, at 144-45 (“In civil 
cases and especially tort cases, judges can be seen to enforce Daubert aggressively and often 
insightfully, showing considerable acumen about research methodology.  In other categories 
of cases, judges appear to be either incapable of applying Daubert to the expertise before 
them, or unwilling to do so, and find ways to evade the burden or to hedge the result that 
would have emerged if they had conscientiously undertaken the burden Daubert imposes on 
judges.  These latter categories certainly include criminal cases, especially where the 
government proffers crime laboratory experts whose expertise purports to link evidence 
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Courts have admitted this disparity, too.
224
  For example, one court, in 
evaluating proffered forensic handwriting expertise, concluded, “Were the 
court to apply Daubert to the proffered FDE [forensic document examiner] 
testimony, it would have to be excluded.  This conclusion derives from a 
straightforward analysis of the suggested Daubert factors.”225  The court 
felt that it “might well have concluded that forensic document examination 
constitutes precisely the sort of junk science that Daubert addressed.”226  
Nevertheless, the court admitted the expert testimony.
227
  In another 
criminal case, the court held bite mark testimony admissible, while 
remarking that such evidence is “often speculative” and leaving it at that.228 
In a recent study comparing treatment of handwriting analysis in civil 
and criminal cases, Professor Julie Seaman found that “the Daubert 
standard indeed may be disparately applied to even very similar evidence 
when offered in criminal versus civil cases.”229  According to the study, “In 
                                                                                                                 
from the crime scene to the defendant.  In these categories of cases, the principles of 
Daubert seem to vanish.”). 
 223. Saks, supra note 31, at 145; see also Vickers, supra note 191, at 109-10 (reporting 
that in the civil context, “studies show that after Daubert, parties challenged the 
admissibility of evidence more frequently, and judges scrutinized evidence more carefully, 
excluding a greater proportion of it”). 
 224. Julie A. Seaman, A Tale of Two Dauberts, 47 GA. L. REV. 889, 892 n.12 (2013) (“In 
the federal courts, where a uniform standard ostensibly applies, a more or less explicit 
acknowledgement occasionally peeks through.” (citing United States v. Prime, 220 F. Supp. 
2d 1203, 1210 (W.D. Wash. 2002), aff'd, 363 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that “the 
court reasoned that certain time-tested forensic techniques used by law enforcement should 
not be excluded simply because of a lack of scientific data, methods, or statistical 
significance”)); see also Murphy, supra note 1, at 624 (“Indeed, some criminal courts 
admitting forensic evidence despite defense challenges to reliability have expressly 
conceded that the proposed conclusions lack any scientific basis in data, methods, or 
statistical significance—and yet nonetheless embraced them citing nothing more than their 
longstanding pedigree.”). 
 225. United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 226. Id. at 1028. 
 227. Id. at 1049. 
 228. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 263 (Tenn. 1994); see also Erica Beecher-Monas, 
Reality Bites: The Illusion of Science in Bite–Mark Evidence, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1369, 
1373 (2009) (examining the court decision in Cazes) (“This is a far cry from the exacting 
standards that the civil courts demand of expert evidence.”). 
 229. Seaman, supra note 224, at 892.  But see id. (cautioning that her study was “hardly a 
scientific sample”).  Professor Seaman also examined fire science testimony and found that 
the rates were similar for both civil and criminal cases.  Yet fire science testimony is often 
offered by defendants in civil cases, who enjoy a much higher success rate in civil cases than 
defendants in criminal cases do.  Id. at 898; see Risinger, supra note 212, at 99 
(summarizing that “when civil defendants' proffers are challenged by plaintiffs, those 
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the handwriting cases, prosecution evidence was admitted in nearly 90% of 
the criminal cases, whereas on the civil side it was admitted (or at least not 
excluded) in fewer than 40% of cases.”230 
The disparity between courts in civil and criminal dockets leaves many 
wondering why.  As the court in United States v. Hebshie remarked, “it 
cannot be that science is different in criminal cases than in civil ones.  Bad 
science is bad science; unreliable methodologies are unreliable 
methodologies, no matter the side of the docket.”231  The stakes are 
certainly high enough in criminal settings.  In a criminal case, “the outcome 
of the decision to admit or exclude expert testimony could affect the 
defendant's freedom, liberty, and life.”232  Some even suggest that “[a]s a 
general proposition, judges disfavor civil plaintiffs and criminal defendants 
and are more likely to rule against them than against their opposites even 
when presenting equivalent evidence or arguments.”233  Immediately after 
the Court handed down its decision, Congress attempted to formally exempt 
criminal evidence from the heightened scrutiny of Daubert courts.
234
  
                                                                                                                 
defendants usually win, but when criminal defendants' proffers are challenged by the 
prosecution, the criminal defendants usually lose”); see also Murphy, supra note 1, at 626 
(reexamining the data and concluding that “they reaffirm and deepen the initial underlying 
premise: it depends as much on the offering party as it does on the type of case”); id. at 627 
(“When faced with evidence offered by prosecutors or civil defendants, courts tend to take a 
generous approach, whereas even the same kind of evidence offered by civil plaintiffs is met 
with great skepticism.”). 
 230. Seaman, supra note 224, at 908. 
 231. United States v. Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. 2d 89, 115 (D. Mass. 2010).  “Paradoxically, 
and perhaps shamefully, this standard has not been consistently imposed in criminal cases.”  
Id. (quoting Giannelli, supra note 219, at 1111). 
 232. Groscup et al., supra note 185, at 342. 
 233. Michael J. Saks & David L. Faigman, Expert Evidence After Daubert, 1 ANN. REV. 
L. & SOC. SCI. 105, 122 (2005); see also Murphy, supra note 1 at 622 (“Such findings have 
political and not just legal significance because in both civil and criminal cases, the methods 
and techniques most vulnerable to Daubert scrutiny, as judged by scientific standards, tend 
to be offered by only one side in the litigation.”); D. Michael Risinger, Goodbye to All That, 
or a Fool's Errand, by One of the Fools: How I Stopped Worrying About Court Responses to 
Handwriting Identification (and “Forensic Science” in General) and Learned to Love 
Misinterpretations of Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 43 TULSA L. REV. 447, 473 (2007) 
(concluding after examining how courts have overwhelmingly rejected defense challenges to 
fingerprint evidence, “there is some reason to believe that judges as a group are resistant to 
rejecting prosecution proffers of expert testimony”). 
 234. Murphy, supra note 1, at 624 (“In the wake of Daubert, federal lawmakers 
circulated a bill to exempt criminal evidence from the proposed codification of the Daubert 
test, but their efforts failed.” (citing H.R. 988, 104th Cong. (1995))).  Georgia, however, still 
provides for absolute admission of expert testimony in criminal cases.  GA. CODE ANN. § 24-
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Criminal and civil cases have obvious and important differences, which 
may contribute to the disparity in treatment by the courts.
235
  One primary 
difference is the resources available to criminal and civil defendants.
236
  As 
Professor Paul Giannelli explains, “Instead of worrying about the ‘hired 
gun’ phenomenon as in civil litigation, the criminal defense lawyer often 
lacks money for any ‘gun.’”237  The science in criminal matters is usually 
produced in government labs rather than academic or private scientific 
research.
238
  As a result, “expert evidence in criminal litigation is almost 
exclusively the preserve of the state.”239  Civil defendants enjoy stronger 
discovery mechanisms, such as depositions and interrogatories.
240
  Perhaps 
most compelling, “there are strong policy grounds not to exclude a long 
adopted form of expert evidence, because to do so may not only adversely 
affect current and all future criminal prosecutions (though not 
                                                                                                                 
7-707 (2016) (“In criminal proceedings, the opinions of experts on any question of science, 
skill, trade, or like questions shall always be admissible; and such opinions may be given on 
the facts as proved by other witnesses.”). 
 235. See Giannelli, supra note 219, at 1072 (“The notion that expert testimony in 
criminal and civil cases should be treated differently does not seem, at least to me, to be a 
remarkable proposition.”).   
 236. See Saks, supra note 31, at 145 n.60 (“The government has crime labs dedicated to 
serving police and prosecution needs.  The defense has no institutional resources and 
typically no resources at all with which to hire ad hoc experts to scrutinize, re-analyze, or 
help think about the government's expert's report and testimony.”). 
 237. Giannelli, supra note 219, at 1072 (citing Peter J. Neufeld & Neville Colman, When 
Science Takes the Witness Stand, SCI. AM., May 1990, at 46, 50 (“In DNA cases in 
Oklahoma and Alabama, . . . the defense did not retain any experts, because the presiding 
judge had refused to authorize funds.”)).  
 238. See Dwyer, supra note 212, at 390-91 (“[M]uch of the expert evidence presented at 
a criminal trial is the product of disciplines that have been developed for the criminal 
process, while most expert evidence in civil trials is in use in society more widely, including 
in the area of academic scientific research.”). 
 239. Id. at 391 (citing three reasons for this) (“First, almost all specialists in forensic 
science are employed by the state; secondly, most defendants are unable to afford to instruct 
their own experts, and public defense funds are limited in all jurisdictions; thirdly, the state 
controls crime scenes and physical evidence, and in turn access to materials for scientific 
testing.”). 
 240. See Giannelli, supra note 219, at 1073 (“What is remarkable about the civil-criminal 
dichotomy is that civil litigants have far greater discovery rights than criminal practitioners 
even though it is well accepted that pretrial disclosure is critical.  Not only are discovery 
depositions and interrogatories unavailable, but a defendant in a death penalty case involving 
DNA can be precluded from seeing an expert's lab notes before trial.”).  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
802 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:759 
 
 
investigations), but may also open the floodgates to appeals in all cases in 
which fingerprint identification evidence played a part.”241  
B. Disparities in the Courts Part II:  Between Parties (in Both Criminal and 
Civil Courts) 
In addition to applying different standards across dockets, courts apply 
Daubert differently depending on which side the party is on.
242
  A major 
study
243
 by Professor Michael Risinger found that courts excluded plaintiffs' 
proffered evidence at significantly higher rates than courts excluded 
defense evidence.
244
  Evaluating appellate opinions, the study found that 
approximately 90% of the challenges to expert witness testimony were 
raised by civil defendants against plaintiffs’ experts, and defendants’ 
challenges were successful approximately two-thirds of the time.
245
  On the 
flip side, in the comparatively small number of cases in which plaintiffs 
challenged defense experts, plaintiffs’ challenges were successful roughly 
half the time.
246
  Other studies have replicated Professor Risinger's findings 
through various means.
247
  For example, a recent study from George Mason 
University confirmed a similar disparity.
248
  
Professor Risinger also examined criminal courts.  There, too, he found 
disturbing patterns.  He identified 120 criminal appeal cases in which 
Daubert had been cited.
249
  Of these, sixty-seven were cases in which the 
government challenged the exclusion of its experts.
250
  In those sixty-seven 
                                                                                                                 
 241. Dwyer, supra note 212, at 392. 
 242. See, e.g., Vickers, supra note 191, at 136-37 (“[C]ivil defendants prevail in their 
challenges to expert testimony most of the time, while criminal defendants ‘virtually always 
lose their reliability challenges.’”). 
 243. Professor Murphy called the Risinger study “iconic.”  Murphy, supra note 1, at 623.   
 244. See generally Risinger, supra note 212, at 99 (“This article shows that, as to proffers 
of asserted expert testimony, civil defendants win their Daubert reliability challenges to 
plaintiffs' proffers most of the time.”). 
 245. Id. at 108. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Murphy, supra note 1, at 623 (citing NAS REPORT, supra note 220, at 11; Paul C. 
Giannelli, Daubert and Criminal Prosecutions, 26 CRIM. JUST. 61 (2011)).  
 248. JAMES COOPER, TIMING AND DISPOSITION OF DAUBERT MOTIONS IN FEDERAL 
DISTRICT COURT: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION ii (Geo. Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Searle 
Civil Justice Inst. 2015) (reviewing ten years of data from ninety-one federal district courts 
and concluding that “[d]efendants are more likely than plaintiffs to have at least a portion of 
their Daubert motion granted”). 
 249. Risinger, supra note 212, at 105. 
 250. Id. 
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cases, the prosecution prevailed in sixty-one of them.
251
  On the other hand, 
of fifty-four challenges by criminal defendants that their expert was 
improperly excluded, the defendant lost forty-four cases.
252
  Of the ten that 
the criminal defendants won, only one case was actually remanded for 
retrial.
253
  As one commentator summarized, “It would seem that the expert 
evidence of civil plaintiffs, particularly in toxic tort cases, is subject to 
greater scrutiny than that of civil defendants, while the expert evidence of 
criminal prosecutors is subject to less scrutiny than that of criminal 
defendants, or than that of civil parties.”254 
C. Junk Forensic Science 
Two landmark studies by the federal government have validated deeply 
troubling issues with the use of forensic science in American courts.  In 
2009, the National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) issued a “scathing 
indictment”255 of the status of forensic science256 and concluded that, 
“[w]ith the exception of nuclear DNA analysis, . . . no forensic method has 
been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high 
degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a 
specific individual or source.” 257  The report pulled no punches.  According 
to the report, “The law's greatest dilemma in its heavy reliance on forensic 
evidence . . . concerns the question of whether—and to what extent—there 
is science in any given ‘forensic science’ discipline.”258 
                                                                                                                 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 106. 
 253. Id. at 106-07. 
 254. See Dwyer, supra note 212, at 383 (“[Although] [t]here are significant 
methodological difficulties with inferring general trial conduct from reported decisions, and 
particularly where those decisions are appellate[,] [t]he published reports do broadly support 
the anecdotal evidence of the unequal application of Daubert.”).  
 255. Moriarty, supra note 18, at 300. 
 256. NAS REPORT, supra note 220, at 7.  The report was initiated in 2005, “when 
Congress mandated that the National Research Council, the research arm of the U.S. 
National Academy of Sciences, undertake the first serious governmental study of forensic 
science.”  Lander, supra note 19, at 1663. 
 257. NAS REPORT, supra note 220, at 7-8.  The NAS Report noted that “[n]ew doubts 
about the accuracy of some forensic science practices have intensified with the growing 
numbers of exonerations resulting from DNA analysis (and the concomitant realization that 
guilty parties sometimes walk free).”  Id. at 37. 
 258. NAS REPORT, supra note 220, at 87; see also id. at 7-8 (“The simple reality is that 
the interpretation of forensic evidence is not always based on scientific studies to determine 
its validity.”). 
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In 2016, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology 
(“PCAST”) issued a similarly damning report on forensic “feature-
comparison” methods.259  In its 150-page report, PCAST detailed how bite 
mark comparison evidence, shoeprint evidence, and firearms evidence are 
not foundationally valid.
260
  PCAST determined that “there are two 
important gaps” in the state of forensic science: “(1) the need for clarity 
about the scientific standards for the validity and reliability of forensic 
methods[;] and (2) the need to evaluate specific forensic methods to 
determine whether they have been scientifically established as valid and 
reliable.”261  
In these two reports, the federal government acknowledged the crisis 
exposed by the “large numbers of cases later shown by post-conviction 
DNA tests to have been wrongful convictions of innocent defendants” 
based on faulty science.
262
  Yet despite the government’s study and the 
growing number of exonerated innocent defendants, “junk science” 
nevertheless continues to be freely admitted into courtrooms by judges, 
including some methods of identification so unreliable that they are not 
“foundationally valid.”263  And courts compound and continue the problem 
by relying on past cases without questioning even the most archaic 
justifications.
264
  
                                                                                                                 
 259. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF 
FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 1 (2016) [hereinafter PCAST].  According to former co-
chair of PCAST, Professor Eric Lander, “PCAST is the leading scientific and technological 
advisory body to the executive branch, originally chartered by President Eisenhower in the 
weeks after the launch of Sputnik.”  Lander, supra note 19, at 1664.  “Feature-comparison” 
methods are “methods that attempt to determine whether an evidentiary sample . . . is or is 
not associated with a potential ‘source’ sample . . . based on the presence of similar patterns, 
impressions, or other features in [each] sample.”  PCAST, supra, at 1. 
 260. PCAST, supra note 259, at 7-14. 
 261. Id. at 1. 
 262. Garrett & Fabricant, supra note 182, at 1561; Lander, supra note 19, at 1662-63 
(“Roughly half of these cases involved forensic-science evidence that was faulty—
sometimes egregiously so.  The problem could not simply be blamed on a few ‘bad apples’ 
among forensic examiners.  Rather, the failure was systemic in that some of the supposedly 
scientific methods had never been shown to be scientifically valid.”). 
 263. PCAST, supra note 259, at 7-14.  
 264. Cole, supra note 114, at 1195-97.  The inappropriateness of relying on past 
assessments of science was keenly pointed out by Professor Moriarty in what she described 
as the general “fallacy of historical reliance.”  See Moriarty, supra note 18, at 316 (“As late 
as 1920, the use of lancets and leeches for bloodletting was favored by some physicians to 
treat pneumonia.”). 
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One primary source of the problem is that much of forensic testimony is 
generated in crime labs, which have come under fire for both institutional 
issues and recent scandals.  Crime labs are connected to (and therefore 
closely aligned with) police departments, a link that undoubtedly creates 
strong incentives to provide prosecutors and police with what they want, 
rather than generate valid results.
265
  As a result, forensic science testimony 
in criminal courts is “subject to significant unconscious bias” by experts 
“seeking to help their bosses, the prosecutors.”266 Moreover, crime labs are 
often underfunded, leading to significant quality control problems.
267
  The 
lack of adequate resources has meant that “there is no division of labor 
between forensic analysis and interpretation.”268   Despite their pristine 
image on TV, the reality is that many crime labs suffer from poor training 
and a failure to follow protocols.
269
   
                                                                                                                 
 265. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 36.  Publicly funded crime labs have, typically, an 
incentive to gain convictions independently of the guilt or innocence of the convicted 
person.  See Roger Koppl & Meghan Sacks, The Criminal Justice System Creates Incentives 
for False Convictions, 32 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 126, 128, 135, 139, 147 (2013) (stating that in 
several states, for example, state law establishes that public crime labs be funded in part per 
conviction); Paul C. Giannelli, Regulating DNA Laboratories: The New Gold Standard?, 69 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 617, 619 (2014) (citing John I. Thornton, Criminalistics—Past, 
Present, and Future, 11 LEX ET SCIENTIA 1, 27 (1975) (“Because crime laboratories 
developed in police departments, they were imbued, unsurprisingly, with a law enforcement 
culture.”)). 
 266. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 36 (“Moreover, the structure of the forensic science 
system means that such bias, or even outright fraud, is likely to go undiscovered.”); Craig M. 
Cooley, Nurturing Forensic Science, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 441, 442 (2011) 
(“[S]ignificant evidence has surfaced over the last decade indicating that public crime 
laboratories . . . are inadequately funded, staffed, and regulated.”). 
 267. Crime labs generally lack the resources and the capability to conduct foundational 
research.  Giannelli, supra note 265, at 620 n.14.  As Professor Giannelli summarizes:  
First, the early crime labs, as is still true today, were operational, not research, 
laboratories.  Second, basic research can be both time-consuming and 
expensive, and the underfunding of crime laboratories has been chronic.  Third, 
even if research was perceived to be desirable, these laboratories were ill-
equipped to conduct it.  Police officers, whose skills were developed through 
on-the-job training, staffed these labs. 
Id. 
 268. Roger Koppl, How to Improve Forensic Science, 20 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 255 (2005). 
 269. See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, CSI Is a Lie, ATLANTIC, (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www. 
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/csi-is-a-lie/390897/ (detailing crime lab issues in 
Massachusetts, St. Paul, Colorado, Detroit, Philadelphia, and North Carolina).  See generally 
Mark Hansen, Crime Labs Under the Microscope After a String of Shoddy, Suspect and 
Fraudulent Results, ABA J. (Sept. 2013), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ 
crime_labs_under_the_microscope_after_a_string_of_shoddy_suspect_and_fraudu/; Jordan 
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Two public scandals highlight the issue.  The Houston, Texas crime lab 
was first exposed as “the paradigmatic example of a failed forensic agency” 
in 2002.
270
  That year, a state audit revealed a “dysfunctional organization 
with serious contamination issues and an untrained staff using shoddy 
science.”271 As Professor Giannelli explained:  
As described by a subsequent investigation, the DNA Section 
was in shambles—plagued by a leaky roof, operating for years 
without a line supervisor, overseen by a technical leader who had 
no personal experience performing DNA analysis and who was 
lacking the qualifications required under the FBI standards, 
staffed by underpaid and undertrained analysts, and generating 
mistake-ridden and poorly documented casework.
272
   
Several defendants were identified as wrongly convicted and have since 
been exonerated after the report.
273
  According to Texas state senator 
                                                                                                                 
Michael Smith, Forget CSI: A Disaster Is Happening in America’s Crime Labs, BUS. 
INSIDER, (Apr. 30, 2015, 1:00 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/forensic-csi-crime-
labs-disaster-2014-4#ixzz3N4ORFkgq. 
 270. Giannelli, supra note 265, at 634. 
 271. Id. at 634 (quoting Quality Assurance Audit of Houston Police Department Crime 
Lab—DNA/Serology Section (Dec. 12-13, 2002)); see also Nick Madigan, Houston's 
Troubled DNA Crime Lab Faces Growing Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2003, at L20 
(reporting that operations were suspended after the audit found numerous problems, 
“including poor calibration and maintenance of equipment, improper record keeping and a 
lack of safeguards against contamination. . . .  Among other problems, a leak in the roof was 
found to be a potential contaminant of samples on tables below.”). 
 272. Giannelli, supra note 265, at 634 (quoting MICHAEL R. BROMWICH, THIRD REPORT 
OF THE INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATOR FOR THE HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT CRIME 
LABORATORY AND PROPERTY ROOM 5 (2005)). 
 273. See Adam Liptak & Ralph Blumenthal, New Doubt Cast on Testing in Houston 
Police Crime Lab, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/05/us/ 
new-doubt-cast-on-testing-in-houston-police-crime-lab.html (summarizing a report that the 
Houston crime lab offered “‘false and scientifically unsound’ reports and testimony”).  The 
issues with the crime lab are still prevalent.  See Brian Rogers et al., Crime-Scene Errors Put 
65 Cases Under Review, Audit Finds, HOUS. CHRON. (Apr. 12, 2017), 
https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/New-evidence-problems-raise-questions-
in-65-11068118.php (describing “errors by a Houston crime-scene investigator [that] raised 
questions about key evidence in cases that include [twenty-six] homicides, [five] officer-
involved shootings, and [six] child deaths since 2015”); Brian Rogers, Ex-Crime Lab Analyst 
Told HPD Colleagues of Wrongdoing, HOUS. CHRON. (June 25, 2014), 
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Former-HPD-crime-
lab-analyst-told-colleagues-of-5580097.php (reporting “systemic, long-running complaints” 
regarding the Houston Crime Lab dating back to 2002 which resulted in retesting evidence 
in 185 cases, including fifty-one murders). 
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Rodney Ellis, “the validity of almost any case that has relied upon evidence 
produced by the lab is questionable.”274 
A recent scandal in St. Paul, Minnesota is another example.  Two 
independent reviews of the St. Paul Police crime lab found “major errors in 
almost every area” of the crime lab's work, including the processing of 
fingerprint and crime scene evidence.
275
  Employees claimed that some of 
the lab equipment was so poorly ventilated, that it spewed illegal substances 
into the air and contaminated subsequent tests.
276
  The St. Paul Police 
Department and other elements in the city government had supposedly 
known of the problems for years.
277
  An earlier report had made specific 
recommendations, but the city and the police department did not follow 
through on many of the major recommendations.
278
  
D. Specific Examples 
1. Hair Analysis 
Of the forensic science errors associated with wrongful convictions, 
microscopic hair comparison is near the top of the list.
279
  The FBI and DOJ 
                                                                                                                 
 274. Rodney Ellis, Editorial, Want Tough on Crime? Start by Fixing Houston Police 
Department Lab, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 5, 2004, at D1. 
 275. The inventory of dysfunction at the crime lab is distressing in its breadth: 
The failures include sloppy documentation, dirty equipment, faulty techniques 
and ignorance of basic scientific procedures, according to reports released 
Thursday.  Lab employees even used Wikipedia as a "technical reference" in at 
least one drug case. Consultants found lab employees mistakenly classified at 
least one-third of all fingerprints as unidentifiable and destroyed them. Case 
files "were largely unintelligible," consultants found. The lab lacked any clean 
area designated for the review and collection of DNA evidence. The lab stored 
crime scene photos on a computer that anyone could access without a 
password. Conditions at the lab violated federal safety and health requirements.   
Madeleine Baran, Troubled St. Paul Crime Lab Problems Even Worse Than First Thought, 
Probe Reveals, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS (Feb. 14, 2013), 
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2013/02/14/news/saint-paul-crime-lab-major-errors-found. 
 276. Chao Xiong, Crime Lab Reviews Cost $140K, STAR TRIB., Sept. 7, 2012, at B1.  
Concerns were raised about tests being made unreliable from technicians’ failures to change 
their gloves in between tests, as well as the reuse of the same tools on multiple samples.  Id. 
 277. David Hanners, St. Paul Crime Lab Woes First Recognized in 2006, PIONEER PRESS, 
Sept. 1, 2012, at 1A.  A prior report by one police official recommended new accreditation 
and millions for new equipment and employee costs.  Id. 
 278. Id.  The report further provided that the paucity of monies available to the lab had 
overburdened the staff and limited the laboratory's ability to “sustain [its] current rates of 
evidence examination and testing.”  Id. 
 279. See Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and 
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 15 (2009) (reviewing multiple cases and reporting 
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recently announced that in cases where hair analysis testimony had been 
offered, “at least 90 percent of trial transcripts” contained “erroneous 
statements” concerning the forensic evidence.280  According to the report, 
“Twenty-six of 28 FBI agent/analysts provided either testimony with 
erroneous statements or submitted laboratory reports with erroneous 
statements.”281  In the first stage of the analysis, the government had 
already determined that “[d]efendants in at least 35 of [those] cases 
received the death penalty” and that errors were present in nearly all of 
those cases (94%).
282
  Tragically, “[n]ine of [the] defendants have already 
been executed[,] and five died of other causes while on death row.”283  As 
Peter Neufeld, Co-Director of the Innocence Project, summarized the 
report, “FBI microscopic hair analysts committed widespread, systematic 
error, grossly exaggerating the significance of their data under oath with the 
consequence of unfairly bolstering the prosecutions' case.”284    
As a result of its recent analysis, the FBI sent letters to the governor of 
every state in the country urging states to re-evaluate cases where 
microscopic hair comparison was used to conclude a match.
285
  But the FBI 
has known for years that hair analysis is a faulty science in criminal courts.  
A 2002 paper by FBI scientists revealed that, “in contrast to earlier work 
claiming that hairs from different sources could be distinguished with an 
error rate of only 1 in 40,000 comparisons, DNA analysis of casework 
revealed that 11 percent of hairs (that is, 1 in 9) reported as microscopically 
                                                                                                                 
that hair analysis may provide reliable evidence on some characteristics of the individual 
from which the specimen was taken, but it may not be able to reliably match the specimen 
with a specific individual). 
 280. See Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, FBI Testimony on Microscopic 
Hair Analysis Contained Errors in at Least 90 Percent of Cases in Ongoing Review (Apr. 20, 
2015), https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-testimony-on-microscopic-hair-
analysis-contained-errors-in-at-least-90-percent-of-cases-in-ongoing-review (finding that 
“erroneous statements were made in . . . (96 percent) of the cases” so far reviewed).   
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id.  The problem is much broader than just the FBI.  The report also acknowledged 
that the same faulty hair analysis science has been spread throughout state and local 
enforcement agencies.  See id. (“Over the course of 25 years, the FBI conducted multiple 
two-week training courses that reached several hundred state and local hair examiners 
throughout the country and that incorporated some of the same scientifically flawed 
language that the FBI’s examiners had used in some lab reports and often in trial 
testimony.”). 
 285. Letter from James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau Investigation, to State Governors 
(Feb. 26, 2016) (on file with author). 
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indistinguishable actually came from different sources.”286  In its review of 
hair analysis support materials provided by the DOJ, PCAST found that the 
“papers described in the DOJ supporting document do not provide a 
scientific basis for concluding that microscopic hair examination is a valid 
and reliable process.”287  To date, over seventy people have been 
exonerated after hair analysis was used to convict.
288  
 One particular case is 
emblematic.  Santae Tribble, convicted of murder after an FBI analyst 
testified that hair from a stocking mask linked Tribble to the crime and 
“matched in all microscopic characteristics,” spent twenty-eight years “in 
prison before DNA testing revealed that none of the 13 hairs belonged to 
Tribble and that one came from a dog.”289 
2. Fingerprints 
The idea that fingerprint “matches” were not as absolute as previously 
understood came into full public view when American lawyer Brandon 
Mayfield was falsely accused of the Madrid train bombings in 2004.
290
  An 
FBI examiner concluded with “100 percent” certainty that a fingerprint at 
the crime scene matched Mayfield.
291
  Although there was no record of 
                                                                                                                 
 286. Lander, supra note 19, at 1672; see also PCAST, supra note 259, at 28 (explaining 
that the 2002 FBI analysis demonstrated that “the power of microscopic hair comparison to 
distinguish between samples from different sources was much lower than previously 
assumed”).  One other issue is lax judicial review.  In one stunning example, the Kentucky 
Supreme Court acknowledged that the record cited no studies, and therefore contained 
nothing that could support findings that the microscopic hair analysis had been satisfactorily 
tested, or that methodologically competent studies existed (whether published and peer 
reviewed or otherwise), and therefore no data existed regarding error rates.  Johnson v. 
Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 258, 261 (Ky. 1999).  Nevertheless, the Kentucky Supreme 
Court thought the evidence was admissible thanks to the general acceptance factor.  Id. at 
262. 
 287. PCAST, supra note 259, at 120. 
 288. Hair Analysis Archives, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
cases-categories/hair-analysis/#hair-analysis,exonerated-by-dna (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).  
For fourteen defendants who had either been executed or died of other causes while awaiting 
execution, the study came too late.  Id. 
 289. PCAST supra note 259, at 44; Spencer S. Hsu, Santae Tribble Cleared in 1978 
Murder Based on DNA Hair Test, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2012, at A30 (reporting that Tribble 
spent twenty-eight years in prison).  
 290. See Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert Challenges to Fingerprints, 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 624, 
635 (2006) (“The terrorist train bombing in Madrid on March 11, 2004, which killed 191 
and injured 2,000, exploded the myth of fingerprint infallibility more than any other 
event.”). 
 291. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OVERSIGHT & REVIEW DIV., A REVIEW OF THE FBI'S 
HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE 64 (2006) [hereinafter OIG MAYFIELD REPORT 
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Mayfield having traveled to Spain, and he did not even have a valid 
passport,
292
 the FBI detained Mayfield for fourteen days based on the 
fingerprint match, until Spanish authorities identified a different suspect as 
the source of the fingerprint.
293
  In its 2011 report, the Office of Inspector 
General concluded that the examiners “made errors in their application of 
the latent fingerprint methodology that reflected systemic problems with the 
FBI Laboratory’s operations.”294  In a previous report, the Office of 
Inspector General had also determined that the fact that Mayfield was a 
Muslim and had previously represented a convicted terrorist “also likely 
contributed to the examiners’ failure” to catch the error.295 
While courts have been admitting fingerprint evidence for over a 
hundred years,
296
 the NAS Report in 2009 criticized the process for 
                                                                                                                 
I].  The affidavit submitted for the material witness warrant stated that the FBI senior 
fingerprint examiner had a 100% certainty that the fingerprint at the crime scene matched 
Mayfield.  Id. at 63-64.  The assessment was verified by the supervisor, who had thirty years 
of experience in the FBI fingerprint lab.  Id. at 64. 
 292. See id. at 58 (“Records reveal no travel by Mayfield or his wife as both have expired 
passports.”).  Undeterred, the FBI adapted the working hypothesis that Mayfield conducted 
the crime from the United States.  See id. (“At this time, we are leaning toward the theory 
that Mayfield touched the bag in the U.S.”). 
 293. Id. at 1. 
 294. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OVERSIGHT & REVIEW DIV., A REVIEW OF THE FBI'S 
PROGRESS IN RESPONDING TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 
GENERAL REPORT ON THE FINGERPRINT MISIDENTIFICATION IN THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE 
2 (2011) [hereinafter OIG MAYFIELD REPORT II].  The OIG “made 18 recommendations to 
improve the FBI Laboratory’s latent print operations and help prevent future 
misidentifications” as a result of its findings.  Id. 
 295. OIG MAYFIELD REPORT I, supra note 291, at 179.  However, “[t]he OIG [also] 
concluded that Mayfield's religion was not the sole or primary cause of the FBI's failure to 
question the original misidentification and catch its error.”  Id. at 12 (“The primary factors 
were the similarity of the prints and the laboratory's overconfidence in the superiority of its 
examiners.”). 
 296. See OIG MAYFIELD REPORT II, supra note 294, at 19-20 (reviewing the case law and 
concluding that “courts have, almost without exception, upheld the admissibility of latent 
fingerprint evidence in response to Daubert challenges”); Mara L. Merlino et al., Meeting 
the Challenges of the Daubert Trilogy: Refining and Redefining the Reliability of Forensic 
Evidence, 43 TULSA L. REV. 417, 432 (2007) (“The use of fingerprints and latent print 
examination as proof of identity has been a mainstay of the criminal justice system and 
forensic science since it was first used in the 1910 trial of Thomas Jennings for the murder 
of Clarence Hiller.”); Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: 
Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 127, 128 (2008), 
https://academic.oup.com/lpr/article/7/2/127/916583 (describing judicial opinions that laud 
fingerprint evidence as having “survived an entire century of testing within the crucible of 
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identifying suspects based entirely on their fingerprints because it lacked an 
industry-wide match standard.
297
  Similarly, PCAST concluded that 
“estimated false positive rates are much higher than the general public . . . 
would likely believe based on longstanding claims about the accuracy of 
fingerprint analysis.”298  Few courts have carefully examined the reliability 
of latent fingerprint testimony, instead relying on past decisions as 
justification to allow the less-than-completely-accurate science.
299
  Indeed, 
while there have been dozens of challenges to the admissibility of 
fingerprint evidence using Daubert, “not a single court has been able to cite 
any systematic empirical evidence supporting critical propositions 
underlying fingerprint identification claims.”300  It was not until the 
mistaken identification of an American lawyer in the Madrid railway 
bombing that the FBI began a thorough review of fingerprint evidence and 
initiated changes in protocols.
301
 
  
                                                                                                                 
the courtroom”).  “Every circuit that has [ruled on] the admissibility of latent fingerprint 
evidence has held that it is reliable.”  OIG MAYFIELD REPORT II, supra note 294, at 20 n.22. 
 297. NAS REPORT, supra note 220, at 140-41 (discussing the degree to which latent 
fingerprint analysis relies on the subjective interpretation of individual examiners). 
 298. PCAST, supra note 259, at 95. 
 299. Garrett & Fabricant, supra note 182, at 1570 (reviewing cases from every circuit 
and finding that courts “typically do not conduct any meaningful analysis of reliability of 
fingerprint evidence”).  Instead, they rely on precedent.  Id. (citing as examples United 
States v. Spotted Elk, 548 F.3d 641, 663 (8th Cir. 2008) (failing to discuss the requirements 
of court oversight but noting that fingerprint evidence has been recognized by other courts as 
“generally accepted” (quoting United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672, 682 (8th Cir. 2003))); 
United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005) (declaring that “[w]e agree 
with the decisions of our sister circuits and hold that the fingerprint evidence admitted in this 
case satisfied Daubert” but failing to discuss or analyze any of the requirements)). 
 300. Saks, supra note 31, at 150; see also Mnookin, supra note 296, at 131 (noting “the 
near-universal judicial” acceptance of fingerprint analysis, and her own conclusion that most 
fingerprint evidence should be excluded under Daubert). 
 301. Donna Lee Elm, Continued Challenges for Forensics, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2017, at 
4, 6 (“After the Madrid railway bombing led to the erroneous fingerprint ‘match’ with 
attorney Brandon Mayfield, the FBI initiated strict scientific studies to research 
‘confirmation bias’ on fingerprint opinions, resulting in changes in protocols.”); see also 
PCAST, supra note 259, at 90 (“[C]oncerns about the reliability of latent fingerprint analysis 
increased substantially following a prominent misidentification of a latent fingerprint 
recovered from the 2004 bombing of the Madrid commuter train system.”).  PCAST did 
report that there has been improvement in beginning “to move latent print analysis in the 
direction of an objective framework.”  Id. at 91.  Nevertheless, PCAST concluded that 
fingerprint analysis has “a considerable way to go” before achieving objectivity.  Id. at 88. 
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3. Bite Mark Analysis 
As problematic as hair analysis and fingerprint identification are, bite 
mark analysis is discredited like no other science.
302
  After reviewing 
numerous studies, PCAST concluded that “bite mark analysis does not meet 
the scientific standards for foundational validity and is far from meeting 
such standards.”303  The council went even further to suggest that bite mark 
methodology likely “may not be salvageable.”304  PCAST’s findings were 
not new.  In 2009, the NAS Report identified some of the basic problems 
inherent in bite mark analysis, including the lack of any studies to establish 
the uniqueness of bite marks and the tendency of bite marks on the skin to 
be distorted or change over time.
305
 
One of the biggest concerns with bite mark evidence is that it is not 
reliable even to establish the marks “left on a victim's body as bite marks at 
all.”306  In 2016, the Texas Forensic Science Commission conducted a six-
month investigation and “unanimously recommended a moratorium on the 
use of bite mark identifications in criminal trials, concluding that the 
validity of the technique has not been scientifically established.”307  As with 
other questionable forensic science though, courts avoid analysis and 
merely rely on past precedent to admit bite mark evidence.
308
 
                                                                                                                 
 302. M. Chris Fabricant & Tucker Carrington, The Shifted Paradigm: Forensic Science’s 
Overdue Evolution from Magic to Law, 4 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 38 (2016) (“Perhaps no 
discredited forensic assay has benefited more from criminal courts’ abdication of gatekeeper 
responsibilities than bite mark analysis.”). 
 303. PCAST, supra note 259, at 87. 
 304. Id. at 14. 
 305. NAS REPORT, supra note 220, at 175-76. 
 306. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 228, at 1380 (“There is a great deal of controversy 
about the ability of forensic odontologists to identify marks left on a victim's body as bite 
marks at all.”); see also PCAST, supra note 259, at 3 (reviewing studies and finding “that 
current procedures for comparing bite marks are unable to reliably exclude or include a 
suspect as a potential biter”); id. at 87 (“[A]vailable scientific evidence strongly suggests 
that examiners cannot consistently agree on whether an injury is a human bite mark and 
cannot identify the source of bite mark with reasonable accuracy.”).  
 307. Id. at 29; see also Russell D. Covey, Suspect Evidence and Coalmine Canaries, 55 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 537, 570 (2018) (“The Texas Forensic Science Commission has 
recommended a moratorium on the use of bite mark evidence pending further scientific 
validation of the methodology.”). 
 308. See Beecher–Monas, supra note 228, at 1372 (“Courts frequently admit bite mark 
testimony simply because other courts have done so.”) (citing two cases as examples, 
Verdict v. State, 868 S.W.2d 443, 447 (Ark. 1993) (finding no error in admitting bite mark 
testimony of Dr. West because “evidence on human bite marks is widely accepted by the 
courts”); State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 114 (N.J. 1999) (finding bite mark testimony 
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V. What Options Exist for the Big Changes Needed 
In the twenty-five years since the Daubert decision, criminal defendants 
have seen little, if any, benefit from the landmark decision.  And there has 
been insufficient progress toward limiting the unreliable scientific 
testimony used to convict them.
309
  The same lax oversight that the Court 
employed in Barefoot is still the dominant practice in criminal courtrooms 
today.
310
  There will be no easy fixes.  As the Committee co-chairs 
acknowledged in the NAS Report, “The forensic science system, 
encompassing both research and practice, has serious problems that can 
only be addressed by a national commitment to overhaul the current 
structure that supports the forensic science community in this country.”311 
The Court’s decision in Barefoot, the case discussed in the introduction, 
still stands as a cautionary tale.  In the penultimate decision of whether to 
impose death,
312
 the Court had no problem relying on expert testimony—by 
                                                                                                                 
in a capital case to be reliable because “thirty states considering such evidence have found it 
admissible”)). 
 309. See, e.g., Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 279, at 14 (reviewing the cases of 
exonerated defendants where forensic science was used) (“[I]nvalid forensic science 
testimony was not just common but prevalent.  This study found that 82 cases—60% of the 
137 in the study set—involved invalid forensic science testimony.”).  As the authors point 
out, “Though the technology has changed over time, the sources of human error, 
misinterpretation, and misconduct have not.”  Id. at 97; see also Jessica Gabel & Karyn 
Heavenrich, Reigning in the Wild West: The Necessary Outcomes and Inevitable Pitfalls of 
Reforming Forensic Science, 24 ALB. L. J. SCI. & TECH 81, 102 (2014) (“The number of 
individuals convicted based on false evidence is staggering.”).  A Ninth Circuit judge noted 
that “[m]any defendants have been convicted and spent countless years in prison based on 
evidence by arson experts who were later shown to be little better than witch doctors.”  Alex 
Kozinski, Preface: Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, v (2015). 
 310. See NAS REPORT, supra note 220, at 11 (“[T]he vast majority of the reported 
opinions in criminal cases indicate that trial judges rarely exclude or restrict expert 
testimony offered by prosecutors; most reported opinions also indicate that appellate courts 
routinely deny appeals contesting trial court decisions admitting forensic evidence against 
criminal defendants.”).  
 311. Id. at xx. 
 312. The Court has long recognized the fundamental difference in character between 
death and all other penalties.  As the Court has explained, “In capital proceedings generally, 
this Court has demanded that factfinding procedures aspire to a heightened standard of 
reliability.  This especial concern is a natural consequence of the knowledge that execution 
is the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; that death is different.”  Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 
305 (1976)).  
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a psychiatrist known as “Dr. Death”313—that it understood as being wrong 
more often than it was right.
314
  Justice Blackmun, ten years before he 
would author Daubert, implored the Court to apply basic common sense.
315
  
But all is not lost.  Science has played a major role in one of the most 
positive developments in criminal law over the last few decades.  DNA 
evidence has forever changed expectations for increased scientific validity 
and, more importantly, freed hundreds of wrongly convicted.  The decades 
of progress to bring DNA into the mainstream bring hope for future 
reforms.
316
  Efforts similar to those undertaken to establish DNA evidence 
could provide the structural reforms necessary now.
317
  As Professor Adam 
Shniderman explained, “Certainly, if the criminal justice system can 
survive the challenge and exclusion of what is likely to be the most 
conclusive forensic feature comparison discipline, it can survive the 
exclusion of less certain and reliable forensic science disciplines.”318 
Many who have carefully followed the history of forensic science and 
the courts suggest that modifications to the Rules of Evidence and 
clarifications in the instructions to courts would help address the current 
problem.
319
  As the general argument goes, courts need more guidance on 
                                                                                                                 
 313. The psychiatrist in question, James Grigson, nicknamed “Dr. Death,” came to some 
prominence in the documentary film, The Thin Blue Line, which tells the story surrounding 
the capital trial of Randall Adams.  RON ROSENBAUM, TRAVELS WITH DR. DEATH 219 
(1991).  Filmmaker Errol Morris originally planned to do the film on Dr. Grigson but 
changed his mind after investigating Hall’s case.  Id.  Morris’ efforts not only identified the 
actual murderer in the case, but also led to the eventual exoneration of Hall.  Id.  Grigson 
was later reprimanded by the American Psychological Association for his opinion on 
predictions of future dangerousness.  Id. at 218.  
 314. The Court was sufficiently comfortable that “the jury will [] be able to separate the 
wheat from the chaff.”  Barefoot v. Estrelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 n.7 (1983).  Writing for the 
Court, Justice White noted that “[n]either petitioner nor [amicus American Psychological 
Association] suggests that psychiatrists are always wrong with respect to future 
dangerousness, only most of the time.”  Id. at 901.  At another point the Court wrote, “We 
are not persuaded that such testimony is almost entirely unreliable . . . .”  Id. at 899. 
 315. See id. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The Court holds that psychiatric 
testimony about a defendant's future dangerousness is admissible, despite the fact that such 
testimony is wrong two times out of three.”).  
 316. See Adam B. Shniderman, Prosecutors Respond to Calls for Forensic Science 
Reform: More Sharks in Dirty Water, 126 YALE L.J. F. 348, 357-60 (2017) (detailing how 
DNA evidence became a trusted mainstay in criminal courts).   
 317. See id. at 357 (“DNA profiling is an excellent starting point for discussing how best 
to reform scientific evidence.”). 
 318. Id. at 360. 
 319. See, e.g., Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 89, at 44 (“[Y]ears of experience under 
amended Rule 702 teaches that revisions to the Rule are needed.  These revisions need not 
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what the proper criteria are for assessing expert testimony in criminal 
cases.
320
  As part of its recommendations for reform, PCAST stated that one 
of the most effective solutions would be for the Judicial Conference of the 
United States to clarify the meaning of “reliable methods” for forensic 
feature-comparison methods.
321
 
While such reforms would be welcome, it is hard to see how additional 
changes to the rules would have any more impact than previous changes 
did, particularly considering how poorly courts have interpreted the current 
rules.  The rules were changed in 2000 (and again stylistically updated in 
2007) to address lower court confusion over how to apply Daubert.  It is 
clear that those reforms did not have the impact sought.  What would make 
this time different? 
Media reports have had significant impact on forensic evidence, 
particularly when measured against the scope of public awareness.  The 
very public—and highly publicized322—case of Brandon Mayfield clearly 
                                                                                                                 
involve wholesale changes.”); see also Karen Kafadar, The Critical Role of Statistics in 
Demonstrating the Reliability of Expert Evidence, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1617, 1635 (2018) 
(reporting that Brendan Max, chief of the forensic science division at the Chicago Public 
Defender’s Office “recommends the following changes to Rule 702: (1) ‘Require pre-trial 
qualification evidentiary hearings upon written motion of a litigant,’ (2) ‘[r]equire any expert 
who is the subject of a pre-trial qualification hearing to submit to a compulsory deposition, 
and’ (3) ‘[r]equire that experts disclose all the facts and data that support their proffered 
opinions (such as all features in a fingerprint case that support an association between a 
latent print and a suspect)’”); Garrett & Fabricant, supra note 182, at 1564 (“The language 
of Rule 702 is not the sole problem—after all, that language squarely addresses reliability, 
both of methods and their application to the facts.  That reliability language, however, has 
largely been ignored by state and federal judges.  More forceful language might make the 
importance of assessing reliability more salient to judges, perhaps with more detailed 
accompanying guidance in Advisory Committee notes.”). 
 320. Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 89, at 43 (“The Supreme Court is ill-positioned to 
solve this problem.  The Court can decide only issues in the context of specific cases, and 
even if a case cleanly presents one of the many conflicts that have arisen over Daubert, the 
other conflicts would remain.”); see also Lander, supra note 19, at 1676 (“First, many judges 
simply do not know how to apply the concepts of reliability and scientific validity to any 
given scientific discipline. In the absence of a clear definition, they are often willing to 
accept the trappings of reliability (examiners' experience and professional practices) rather 
than insist on actual reliability.  Second, many judges are also reluctant to challenge 
longstanding precedents concerning the admissibility of forensic methods, even when they 
were established long before current problems became apparent.”). 
 321. PCAST, supra note 259, at 20. 
 322. See, e.g., Sharon Begley, Fingerprint Matches Come Under More Fire as 
Potentially Fallible, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2005, 12:01 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB112864132376462238; Sarah Kershaw & Eric Lichtblau, Bomb Case Against 
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pushed the FBI to look more carefully at fingerprint evidence.
323
  The 
agency’s open confession about past misdeeds is certainly a good start, but 
significantly more progress is required.  The media coverage of crime lab 
abuses is another example of increasing public awareness, and in some 
cases it is spearheading reform.
324
  Also, continued media exposure of the 
problems with forensic science would keep up its role in making changes.  
Further exonerations and the promotion of those stories, such as those of 
Santae Tribble and even Dr. Death—the subject of the documentary that 
saved the life of Randall Hall
325—might encourage such changes. 
Both the NAS Report and PCAST Study were heralded as important 
developments in improving how forensic science would be used in criminal 
courts.
326
  The NAS issued the report after Congress, in 2005, ordered it to 
“assess the present and future resource needs of the forensic science 
community,” recognizing that “there exists little to no analysis of the 
remaining needs of the community outside of the area of DNA.”327  The 
members of the NAS committee included research scientists, academics, 
                                                                                                                 
Lawyer Is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/25/ 
us/bomb-case-against-lawyer-is-rejected.html.  
 323. See Epstein, supra note 202, at 747 (“The highly publicized error was a significant 
event in the lead-up to the National Academy of Science review of the state of forensic 
discipline practice and testimony.”). 
 324. See, e.g., Giannelli, supra note 20, at 187 (detailing the history of the problems in 
the Houston crime lab) (“The story began with a television station's investigation, which led 
in turn to a state audit of the lab in December 2002.”).  Another example is the FBI’s 
abandonment of tracing bullets to a specific manufacturer’s batch after 60 Minutes and the 
Washington Post reported problems with reliability.  See Spencer S. Hsu, Justice Dept., FBI 
to Review Use of Forensic Evidence in Thousands of Cases, WASH. POST (July 10, 2012), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/justice-dept-fbi-to-review-use-of-forensic-
evidence-in-thousands-of-cases/2012/07/10/gJQAT6DlbW_story.html? 
noredirect=on&utm_term=.4a3c6514428e; Steve Kroft, Evidence of Injustice: FBI's Bullet 
Lead Analysis Used Flawed Science to Convict Hundreds of Defendants, 60 MINUTES (Nov. 
16, 2007), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/evidence-of-injustice (noting that the CBLA 
paradigm “went unchallenged for 40 years—until [William] Tobin [who was the chief 
metallurgist for the FBI] retired in 1998 and decided to do his own study, discovering that 
the basic premise had never actually been scientifically tested”).  
 325. See infra note 313 and accompanying text. 
 326. See Lander, supra note 19, at 1676 (sharing his assessment as co-chair of PCAST 
from 2009-17) (“They have unanimously agreed that methods have historically lacked 
meaningful scientific validation, that their accuracy has been seriously overstated, and that 
their misuse has led to wrongful convictions.  Moreover, they agree that requiring empirical 
testing is feasible and would increase the quality of forensic science—with benefits for 
prosecutors, defendants, and the public.”). 
 327. NAS REPORT, supra note 220, at 1-2. 
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forensic scientists, pathologists, judges, a defense attorney, and a former 
prosecutor.
328
  In 2015, President Obama requested that PCAST determine 
“whether there were additional steps on the scientific side, beyond those 
already taken by the Administration in the aftermath of the highly critical 
[NAS] report.”329  In response, PCAST established a panel of senior 
advisors that included ten current or former judges, a former U.S. Solicitor 
General, two law-school deans, and two statisticians.
330
    
Despite the work of both of these organizations, neither report made 
much of a dent in criminal courtrooms.  The NAS Report, which is now 
nearly ten years old, is still relatively unknown in most mainstream legal 
circles.
331
  The reality is that “the Report has had minimal impact on the 
admissibility or scope of forensic discipline testimony or the conclusions an 
expert is permitted to present.”332  While it was mentioned in a number of 
court decisions, “[m]any of those involve passing references or discussions 
of whether the Report, when relied upon in a post-conviction proceeding, 
constitutes newly-discovered evidence.”333  In 2017, the National 
Commission on Forensic Science, a product of the NAS Report, “was 
forced to disband as a result of Attorney General Jeff Sessions' decision not 
to renew the Commission's charter.”334 
                                                                                                                 
 328. Id. at v, 287-302; see also Harry T. Edwards, The National Academy of Sciences 
Report in Forensic Sciences: What It Means for the Bench and Bar, 51 JURIMETRICS J. 1 
(2010) (“The Committee was composed of a diverse and accomplished group of 
professionals.  Seven of the 17 Committee members are prominent professionals in the 
forensic science community, with extensive experience in forensic analysis and practice; 11 
members of the committee are trained scientists (with expertise in physics, chemistry, 
biology, engineering, biostatistics, statistics, and medicine); 10 members of the Committee 
have Ph.D.’s., 2 have M.D.’s, 5 have J.D.’s, and one has an M.S. in chemistry.”).  
 329. PCAST, supra note 259, at x. 
 330. Id. at vii-ix; see also Lander, supra note 19, at 1664 (“The unanimous report was the 
result of a year-long study, during which PCAST reviewed 2,100 scientific papers, as well as 
hundreds of pages of input invited from the forensic-science community.”). 
 331. See Epstein, supra note 202, at 757 (“[J]udges and practitioners are often unaware 
of the NAS Report . . . .”). 
 332. Id. at 755 (“Courts have either let the experts continue their testimony in the same 
form as before the Report was issued or ‘toned it down’ in form but not in substance, as 
when an expert would have to testify only that it was his or her ‘opinion’ that the fingerprint 
came from the defendant and no other source or use the term ‘reasonable ballistic certainty’ 
rather than ‘reasonable scientific certainty.’”). 
 333. Id. at 755; see also Garrett & Fabricant, supra note 182, at 1580 (“Very few rulings 
cited to the 2009 [NAS] Report.”). 
 334. Epstein, supra note 202, at 743.  The Commission originated with the 
recommendations of the NAS Report.  See NAS REPORT, supra note 220, at 18 (“The 
committee believes that what is needed to support and oversee the forensic science 
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Similarly, PCAST has already been rejected by prosecutors and courts.
335
  
This is maybe no surprise given that President Obama’s own Attorney 
General did not adopt the report.
336
  Prosecutors immediately rejected its 
findings.
337
  Defense counsel relying on PCAST and its warnings about the 
lack of scientific validity have already been left wanting in the courtroom, 
as courts are rejecting objections to expert testimony based on PCAST’s 
findings.
338
   
                                                                                                                 
community is a new, strong, and independent entity that could take on the tasks that would 
be assigned to it in a manner that is as objective and free of bias as possible—one with no 
ties to the past and with the authority and resources to implement a fresh agenda designed to 
address the problems found by the committee and discussed in this report.”); see also 
Epstein, supra note 202, at 747-48 (detailing the steps from the NAS Report 
recommendation to the actual establishment of the NCFS).  Unfortunately, however, “the 
Commission's work and indeed its existence can be seen as having had no relevance to the 
judiciary.”  Id. at 754 (“As of June 4, 2017, only one reported decision even mentions the 
Commission's existence, and even then, only noting that an expert witness mentioned the 
Commission while describing his credentials, stating he was invited to serve on one of its 
subcommittees.”). 
 335. See Garrett & Fabricant, supra note 182, at 1580 (“New research findings, reports 
from scientific bodies, and changes in the law have had little impact on this analysis.”). 
 336. See Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Designed to Fail: The President's Deference 
to the Department of Justice in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 59 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 387, 452-53 (2017) (“Despite the fact that the PCAST report was authored by nineteen 
preeminent scientists, that its logic and grounding in scientific methods is irrefutable, that it 
was commissioned by the President, and that its results were touted in a press release by the 
White House, the Department [of Justice] simply refused to accept it.”).  The DOJ response 
was noteworthy for both its refusal and for its concision.  “Attorney General Loretta Lynch 
curtly and quickly responded to PCAST's release that, although the Department 
‘appreciate[s] their contribution to the field of scientific inquiry, the [D]epartment will not 
be adopting the recommendations related to the admissibility of forensic science evidence.’”  
Id. at 453 (alteration in original) (quoting Gary Fields, White House Advisory Council 
Report Is Critical of Forensics Used in Criminal Trials, WALL ST. J., (Sept. 20, 2016, 4:25 
PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-advisory-council-releases-report-
critical-of-forensics-used-in-criminal-trials-1474394743).   
 337. See infra note 340 and accompanying text; see also Radley Balko, Opinion, 
Incredibly, Prosecutors Are Still Defending Bite Mark Analysis, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/01/30/incredibly-
prosecutors-are-still-defending-bite-mark-evidence/?utm_term=.b8e2012c4c1b (detailing the 
filings of prosecutors since PCAST and observing that they are “arguing that 
the only opinions that should matter in these cases are those of prior courts, prosecutors, law 
enforcement and the small community of forensic analysts in the very field being 
challenged”). 
 338. See, e.g., State v. Patel, No. LLICR130143598S, 2016 WL 8135385, at *8 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Dec. 28, 2016) (rejecting an objection based on the PCAST report) (“The 
defendant's reference to the PCAST report is insufficient to bring about a different result.  
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That may leave it to the prosecutors, who have yet to embrace forensic 
science reform at the group level.  Indeed, the reaction to PCAST from the 
National District Attorneys Association (NDAA) “leave[s] little hope” that 
the necessary reforms will come from prosecutors.
339
  The NDAA released 
a press statement shortly after PCAST’s report was published criticizing the 
report and arguing that “the opinions expressed by PCAST in their report 
clearly and obviously disregard large bodies of scientific evidence to the 
contrary and rely, at times, on unreliable and discredited research.”340  
NDAA decried the report as “scientifically irresponsible” and cautioned 
that adopting “any” of its recommendations would have a “devastating 
effect” on law enforcement.341    
But the real changes in Daubert in the civil side were as much about 
culture and norms as they were about rules and law.
342
  Changes in attitude 
and processes ushered in whatever “revolution” Daubert brought to toxic 
tort litigation.  Perhaps a similar miracle is possible in criminal courtrooms 
and prosecutors? 
This is not a new idea, of course.
343
  Prosecutors are in the best position 
to make the necessary changes, since they are the ones who offer the 
scientific evidence in question.
344
  Indeed, prosecutors have been on notice 
                                                                                                                 
There is no basis on which this court can conclude, as the defendant would have it, that the 
PCAST report constitutes ‘the scientific community.’”). 
 339. See Shniderman, supra note 316, at 349 (“Initial reactions to the PCAST report from 
the law enforcement community leave little hope that it will inspire any more reform than 
the NAS Report has.”). 
 340. Press Release, Nat'l Dist. Attorneys Ass'n, National District Attorneys Association 
Slams President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology Report (Sept. 2, 2016), 
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20Press%C20Release%C20on%C20PCAST%20Report.p
df. 
 341. Id.  Six weeks later, the NDAA submitted a letter to President Obama detailing its 
concerns about the report.  Letter from Michael A. Ramos, President, Nat'l Dist. Attorneys 
Ass'n, to President Obama (Nov. 16, 2016), http://tinyurl.com/hczkt3k.  The NDAA argued 
that not all of the feature comparison disciplines will necessarily be subject to strict 
admissibility requirements of “science,” because some disciplines incorporate certain aspects 
of science but also constitute “technical” and “specialized knowledge” as described by 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702.  Id. 
 342. See supra notes 187-93 and accompanying text.   
 343. Ten years ago, it was reported that “the legal system and commentators have paid 
little attention to prosecutorial discretion in the use of unreliable expert testimony—despite 
mounting evidence that misconvictions have been based upon unreliable expert testimony.”  
Jane Campbell Moriarty, “Misconvictions,” Science, and the Ministers of Justice, 86 NEB L. 
REV. 1, 23 (2007).   
 344. See Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 279, at 85 (detailing concerns about how 
prosecutors distort and exaggerate “the testimony of the forensic analyst in closings, making 
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long enough that some of the forensic science on which they rely is likely 
unreliable.
345
  Their own ethical obligations should provide some limits.
346
  
They could enact these changes earlier in the process, where the scientific 
evidence is used to consider indictment and proceeding to trial.
347
 
VI. Conclusion 
The revolution that Daubert was to bring regarding how courts managed 
science is still unfinished.
348
  Its impact on toxic tort cases arguably 
provided a necessary framework to improve how lawyers use science 
through expert witnesses.  Its neglect in the criminal courts is a stain on our 
system of justice.  Unreliable forensic science plagues our criminal trials 
and defendants are wrongly convicted as a result.  After two major 
government studies and several decades of calls for reform from 
researchers, academics, and criminal lawyers, there is no longer any doubt 
that a wide range of scientific methods for identifying defendants, in 
                                                                                                                 
claims that the forensic scientist clearly did not make”); Bennett L. Gershman, Misuse of 
Scientific Evidence by Prosecutors, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 17, 18-19 (2003) (“Many, if 
not most, . . . wrongful convictions are attributable to scientific evidence presented by 
prosecutors as trustworthy, and relied on as such by juries, when in fact the evidence was 
erroneous or fraudulent.”). 
 345. See Covey, supra note 307, at 538 (“Even prior to the recent revelations regarding 
these forensic practices, it is virtually inconceivable that prosecutors were not aware of the 
risks involved. Nonetheless, prosecutors have not only used such evidence to obtain scores 
of criminal convictions, but they continue to do so.”). 
 346. See Bruce A. Green, Access to Criminal Justice: Where Are the Prosecutors, 3 TEX. 
A&M L. REV. 515, 527-28 (2016) (“[T]o protect against wrongful convictions, good 
prosecutors should not introduce unreliable evidence, even if, for disciplinary purposes, they 
may do so.  It is unfair for prosecutors to leave it to lay juries to determine the credibility of 
dubious evidence.  A prosecutor has a gate-keeping function to assure the credibility of 
evidence: If prosecutors themselves do not reasonably believe testimony, they should not 
present it to the jury.  And particularly in the case of forensic evidence that a jury lacks the 
scientific and technical capability to evaluate, prosecutors should ensure the reliability of the 
testimony.”). 
 347. Moriarty, supra note 343, at 27 (“If it is too much to ask prosecutors to second-
guess their scientific and expert evidence in the heat of trial or after a conviction, perhaps 
prosecutors should think about their discretionary actions in the pre-indictment and pre-trial 
stages of the case, where much of the forensic science is developed as the bedrock of the 
prosecution.”); see also Covey, supra note 307, at 583 (providing evidence that the 
prosecutorial use of certain types of known unreliable forensic evidence is correlated with 
increased indicators of official misconduct). 
 348. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 37-38 (“Daubert has not done much to alleviate the 
problem of forensic science quackspertise . . . .  These problems demand resolution before 
one can conclude that the Daubert revolution is complete.”). 
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particular, are simply invalid.  Hair analysis, fingerprint identification, and 
bite mark analysis are only the tips of the iceberg.  Until courts and 
prosecutors commit themselves to their respective obligations as 
gatekeepers to preserve the integrity of the science used to convict, our 
criminal justice system will continue to be overrun with “junk science.” 
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